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Abstract  
The goal of this report is twofold. The first is to provide an overview of the 
Finnish unemployment insurance (UI) system. We describe all major changes in 
eligibility criteria, benefit levels and benefit durations since 2000. We also assess 
how these have changed the overall generosity of the benefit scheme over time. 
The second is to summarize what we know about the effects of UI benefits in the 
context of the Finnish labor market. For background we provide a brief look at 
the economic theory of UI, but our main focus is on empirical evidence on 
behavioral responses. We survey the existing evidence and present some new 
results for the effects of eligibility criteria, benefit levels and benefit durations on 
labor market outcomes in Finland.  
Keywords: Unemployment insurance, layoffs, unemployment  
JEL classes: J21, J63, J64, J65 
 
Tiivistelmä                                                             
Raportilla on kaksi tavoitetta. Ensimmäinen on tarjota kattava kuvaus Suomen 
ansiosidonnaisesta työttömyysturvasta 2000-luvulla. Dokumentoimme kaikki 
keskeiset muutokset ansioturvan saantiehdoissa, päivärahojen tasoissa ja 
päivärahakausien kestoissa. Arvioimme myös näiden muutosten yhteis-
vaikutuksia ansioturvan anteliaisuuteen. Toinen tavoite on kerätä yksiin kansiin 
tämänhetkinen tieto ansioturvan käyttäytymisvaikutuksista Suomen työ-
markkinoilla. Taustaksi tarjoamme suppean katsauksen työttömyysvakuutusta 
käsittelevään talousteoreettiseen kirjallisuuteen. Päähuomio on kuitenkin 
ansioturvan käyttäytymisvaikutuksia koskevissa empiirisissä tuloksissa. Käymme 
läpi aiemmat suomalaiset tutkimustulokset sekä raportoimme uusia tuloksia siitä, 
miten työssäoloehdon pituus, ansioturvan taso ja kesto vaikuttavat työttömyyteen 
sekä työttömyyden jälkeisten työsuhteiden laatuun Suomen työmarkkinoilla. 
Asiasanat: Työttömyysvakuutus, irtisanomiset, työttömyys 
JEL-luokat: J21, J63, J64, J65 
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1 Introduction
The unemployment insurance (UI) program provides insurance against income losses due
to unemployment by paying earnings-related beneﬁts to people who have lost their jobs.
The UI beneﬁts do not only help recipients to stay out of poverty but also allow them to
search longer for a new job that matches their skills. This way UI beneﬁts may improve
the allocation of unemployed job seekers and vacant jobs. These beneﬁts also work as an
automatic stabilizer: when unemployment increases, the beneﬁt payments automatically
rise, which increases private spending among the unemployed and hence stimulates the
economy during recessions. However, UI beneﬁts also distort the incentives to work. Some
beneﬁt recipients may therefore search less intensively for a new job or simply wait longer
until they take a job they would have accepted earlier without the beneﬁts. In addition UI
may also induce layoﬀs and quits by distorting the behavior of employed workers and their
employers. Because of these negative side-eﬀects, generous UI beneﬁts are controversial.
The main diﬃculty in designing the UI program is to ﬁnd the right balance between
the beneﬁts of the insurance provided and the costs of undesirable behavioral eﬀects. The
beneﬁt scheme should be designed so that there is always an incentive to search for a new
job rather than passively collect beneﬁts. Indeed, many of the features of the Finnish UI
scheme have been designed to mitigate the adverse incentive eﬀects: (i) eligibility is made
conditional on a certain amount of insured employment history, (ii) the beneﬁts replace
only a fraction of past earnings, (iii) the beneﬁt payments begin only after a waiting
period, which is substantially extended for those who voluntarily quit their job, (iv) the
beneﬁts can be received only for a limited period of time, and (v) the behavior of beneﬁt
recipients is subject to some monitoring, and those who do not comply to the rules take
a risk of being exposed to sanctions. All these components have changed over the past 15
years, some of them many times.
This report provides an overview of the Finnish UI scheme. We document main
changes in eligibility rules, beneﬁt levels and beneﬁt duration since 2000.1 We also assess
how these changes have aﬀected the overall generosity of the UI scheme over time. Another
objective of the report is to summarize empirical evidence on the behavioral eﬀects of UI
in the context of the Finnish labor market. We consider the eﬀects of eligibility criteria,
beneﬁt levels and maximum beneﬁt duration on unemployment inﬂow, unemployment
duration and post-unemployment outcomes, such as the duration and wage of the next
job. We discuss previous empirical work but also present plenty of new empirical evidence.
Most of these empirical ﬁndings are based on recent and in part still ongoing research
conducted at the VATT Institute for Economic Research, which will be published later
1An overview of earlier reforms can be found in Uusitalo (2006).
in separate papers at a more detailed level. Throughout the report our focus is on the
evidence obtained from Finnish data. We also discuss ﬁndings from other countries but
our review of the international evidence is by no means comprehensive or representative.
Before presenting the empirical results, we provide a brief look at the economic theory
of UI. The aim of this discussion is to put our empirical ﬁndings in the right perspective
by pointing out several possible eﬀects of UI that are diﬃcult to quantify and ignored in
our empirical analysis. We also highlight some features found in the UI systems of other
countries that might be adopted in Finland as well.
The report proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the Finnish UI system and its
changes since 2000. Section 3 provides a brief look at the economic theory of UI. Section
4 presents empirical evidence on the behavioral eﬀects of eligibility rules and beneﬁt
generosity. This is followed by a section where we discuss the likely eﬀects of the most
recent changes in the Finnish UI scheme that came into eﬀect at the beginning of 2017.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Unemployment Insurance in Finland
2.1 Current Rules
To be eligible for unemployment compensation the claimant must register as an unem-
ployed job seeker at the local Employment and Economic Development Oﬃce (TE-
toimisto), search actively for a full-time job, and be ready and able to start working
upon receiving a job oﬀer. It is also required that the unemployed individual makes an
activation plan that needs to be approved by a caseworker. This plan may require the
beneﬁt recipient to participate in labor market training or other activation measures.
Unemployment funds pay earnings-related UI beneﬁts (ansiosidonnainen päiväraha)
to their unemployed members who satisfy the employment condition (työssäoloehto), i.e.
have been working and making membership payments for at least 26 weeks within the
last 28 months. Most unemployment funds are administrated by labor unions, but the
UI provided is by regulation the same across all of them.2 Membership in unemployment
funds is voluntary, and it is possible to enroll in a union-aﬃliated unemployment fund
without being a member of the union. In 2015, 90% of employed workers were enrolled
in unemployment funds and 76% were members of a labor union.
As of January 1, 2017, the maximum duration of UI beneﬁts has been 400 days for
2In most other countries, UI is a compulsory government program. Only in Finland, Sweden and
Denmark UI is based on a voluntary system where beneﬁts are paid by the unemployment funds which
are mainly administrated by labor unions but subsidized by government. This is known as a Gent system
because such an arrangement was ﬁrst introduced in the Belgian town of Gent in 1901. (Holmlund, 1998)
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those with at least of three years of work history, and 300 days for those with a shorter
work history. Moreover, workers aged 58 or above may be entitled to 500 days, and those
aged 61 or above on the day when their regular beneﬁts expire may qualify for extended
UI beneﬁts (lisäpäivät) until retirement. These beneﬁt extensions for the older groups are
conditional on a suﬃciently long work history.
The beneﬁts are paid for weekdays, so that there are ﬁve payment days a week.
As such, the maximum duration of regular UI beneﬁts is 60, 80 or 100 calendar weeks
depending on the length of work history and age. Throughout the paper we use the term
UI days for actual payment days but the term UI weeks for calendar weeks consisting of
ﬁve payment days.
There is a waiting period of seven weekdays at the beginning of the unemployment
spell before UI beneﬁt payments start. Receipt of the beneﬁts can be divided over several
unemployment spells, i.e. an individual who does not fulﬁll the employment condition
at the beginning of the current unemployment spell may be entitled to unused UI days
from the previous spell. When a worker becomes employed and fulﬁlls the employment
condition again, he or she will be awarded a new period of 300, 400 or 500 UI days,
depending on his or her age and length of work history, at the beginning of the next
unemployment spell.
The beneﬁt level is determined by the average wage during the period of the insured
employment weeks required for eligibility. Unlike in most other countries, there is no cap
in the beneﬁt level, but the replacement rate declines rapidly with the past wage rate.
Higher beneﬁts are paid for the duration of those active labor market programs (ALMPs)
that are speciﬁed in the individual-speciﬁc activation plan.3
Unemployment fund members who exhaust their UI beneﬁts or who do not satisfy
the employment condition (and do not have unused UI days from the previous spell)
can claim a ﬂat-rate labor market subsidy (työmarkkinatuki) paid by the Social Security
Institution. It is means tested but available for an indeﬁnite period.4 The unemployed
who are not members of an unemployment fund but satisfy the employment condition are
eligible for a ﬂat-rate basic unemployment allowance (peruspäiväraha). This beneﬁt is the
same amount as the labor market subsidy but is not means tested. It is paid for the same
limited period as the UI beneﬁts would have covered. In practice, this beneﬁt type is of
minor importance as the vast majority of unemployed workers is either on earnings-related
beneﬁts or labor market subsidy. All unemployment beneﬁts are taxable income.
3These programs may include labor market training courses, job search training and career coaching,
work and training trials, independent studies approved by employment authorities, and rehabilitative
work.
4Capital income and certain social security transfers may reduce the amount of labor market subsidy.
For those who still live with their parents, also parents' income may reduce the beneﬁt level.
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Unemployment beneﬁt recipients may work a limited amount without losing all of
their beneﬁts. Earnings up to 300 Euros a month are disregarded when determining
UI beneﬁts, and UI recipients who take up a full-time job for less than two weeks or a
part-time job may be entitled to partial UI beneﬁts (soviteltu päiväraha). These workers
are regarded as underemployed or part-time unemployed, and they should continue their
search for a full-time job in exchange for the beneﬁts.
Employers can also temporarily lay oﬀ workers either for a ﬁxed period or without spe-
cifying the length of the layoﬀ period. During a temporary layoﬀ, the worker can receive
unemployment beneﬁts provided he or she satisﬁes the general eligibility conditions. The
employer can also reduce the weekly working days or daily working hours for economic
reasons, in which case the worker may be eligible for partial UI beneﬁts.
Unemployment beneﬁts are ﬁnanced by tax revenue, compulsory insurance premiums
paid by the employers and employed workers, and by membership fees of unemployment
funds. Tax revenues are used to ﬁnance the base part of earnings-related UI beneﬁts, which
equals the full amount of the labor market subsidy, as well as all the ﬂat-rate beneﬁts.
The earnings-related part of UI beneﬁts, i.e. the diﬀerence between the UI beneﬁt and
labor market subsidy, is ﬁnanced by the membership fees of unemployment funds and
compulsory insurance premiums managed by the Unemployment Insurance Fund.5
In 2015, the unemployment funds paid approximately three billion Euros in beneﬁts to
their members. 38% of these beneﬁts were ﬁnanced by tax revenue, 56.5% by compulsory
insurance premiums and 5.5% by membership fees. Of the amount funded by premiums,
approximately 1.4 billion came from employers' premiums and 300 million from employees'
premiums. In 2015 unemployed job seekers not entitled to earnings-related UI beneﬁts
were paid in total approximately two billion Euros in ﬂat-rate beneﬁts. These were
ﬁnanced by tax revenue (94%) and employees' premiums to the Unemployment Insurance
Fund (6%). (Kela and Financial Supervisory Authority, 2016)
It should be stressed that the voluntariness of the Finnish UI program is somewhat
misleading: individuals who opt out of the program by not enrolling in any unemployment
fund do not qualify for UI beneﬁts, but they nevertheless do contribute to ﬁnancing the
earning-related part of the UI beneﬁts received by other workers through the compulsory
insurance premiums. Non-members avoid paying unemployment fund membership fees
but these payments account only for a very small fraction of the overall costs of the UI
scheme. In other words, workers can opt out of receiving UI beneﬁts but not out of paying
insurance premiums when employed. Due to this asymmetry, e.g. Hiilamo et al. (2015)
5Some exceptions to these principles exist. The base part of extended beneﬁts and beneﬁts during
temporary layoﬀs is ﬁnanced in total by the Unemployment Insurance Fund (94.5%) and unemployment
funds (5.5%). Tax revenue is not used for these. In addition, the Unemployment Insurance Fund does
not ﬁnance earnings-related beneﬁt payments of entrepreneurs.
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and Kotamäki and Mattila (2014) have suggested that universal unemployment insurance
should be considered.
Next we describe how the employment condition, beneﬁt levels and beneﬁt durations
have changed during the past 15 years. Then we assess how these changes have aﬀected
the generosity of the UI system across diﬀerent groups.
2.2 Employment Condition
The current employment condition requires that the claimant has been working and ma-
king membership payments to an unemployment fund for at least 26 weeks (contribution
weeks) within the last 28 months (review period) prior to the beneﬁt claim. During
each contribution week the claimant must have worked for at least 18 hours and been
paid above a certain sector-speciﬁc minimum level. The 28-month review period may be
extended if the claimant has been outside the labor force for an acceptable reason, such
as illness, military service or taking care of a child under three. The review period can be
extended up to seven years.
The changes in the eligibility conditions are listed below and illustrated in ﬁgure 1.
• In 2003, the employment condition was reduced from 43 to 34 contribution weeks
for workers who need to re-qualify for the beneﬁts (technically, this group included
all those who had received UI beneﬁts after 1996). At that time the review period
was 24 months. For those who need to qualify for the beneﬁts for the ﬁrst time the
condition remained at 43 weeks but the review period was extended by four months
from 24 to 28 months for this group.
• In 2010, the change was extended to ﬁrst time claimants, reducing their employment
condition to 34 weeks as well. The review period was extended to 28 months also
for past recipients of UI beneﬁts.
• In 2014, the employment condition was reduced to 26 weeks for all unemployed
workers.
The eligibility requirements have become more lenient in other respects as well. Namely,
the rules regarding to what extent self-employment and subsidized employment are coun-
ted in the contribution weeks have been relaxed. Overall the eligibility conditions have
been substantially relaxed since 2003. It is worth noting that these conditions have been
brought back to the level they were in the early 1990s.
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Figure 1: The employment condition during 20002016
2.3 Beneﬁt Level
2.3.1 Full-Time Beneﬁts
The daily beneﬁt without child supplements is determined as
Y =
b+ (w − b)r1 for w ≤ w∗b+ (w∗ − b)r1 + (w − w∗) r2 for w > w,∗
where b is the base part, w is the past daily wage and w∗ is a threshold for the past wage
up to which a higher marginal rate of r1 = 0.45 (versus r2 = 0.2) is applied. The base part
is equal to the full labor market subsidy (in 2017, 32.4 Euros a day).6 The daily wage w
is calculated by dividing the average monthly wage income during the contribution weeks
of the employment condition used for determining beneﬁt eligibility by 21.5. The wage
threshold is deﬁned as a multiple of the base part as w∗ = k · b/21.5, where k = 95. The
beneﬁt rule results in a piecewise linear relationship between the beneﬁt level and past
wage rate with a kink at w∗ (corresponding to the monthly wage of 3078 Euros).
There are two exceptions that increase the beneﬁt level: participation in the labor
market training programs that are speciﬁed in the individual-speciﬁc activation plan, in
which case the higher rates of r1 = 0.55 and r2 = 0.25 are applied, and having dependent
6The labor market subsidy and thus the base part is adjusted yearly based on the Finnish National
Pensions Index, with a typical increase being approximately 0.5%.
6
children (a daily increase of 511 Euros based on the number of children).
Since 2000 the parameters of the beneﬁt formula have been adjusted several times.
We list these parameter changes in table 1 and illustrate their eﬀects on the beneﬁt level
and replacement rates in ﬁgures 23. Apart from the annual index adjustments in the
base part, the following changes have been implemented:
• In 2002, the level of the base part b was increased by 4% in addition to the normal
index-based adjustment. Also the higher marginal rate of r1 was increased from
0.42 to its current level of 0.45.
• In 2003, workers with at least 20 years of work history who were laid oﬀ for economic
reasons started receiving increased beneﬁts. The increased rates were r1 = 0.55 and
r2 = 0.325, and they were applied for the ﬁrst 150 payment days. Additionally,
in order to make the unemployment beneﬁts more comparable with pension levels,
the rate r2 was also separately increased to 0.325 (while keeping r1 at 0.45) for the
oldest workers receiving extended UI beneﬁts. These increases replaced a previous
severance pay system, which was abolished in 2003.
• In 2005, another category of increased beneﬁts was introduced for workers with at
least three years of work history who were laid oﬀ for economic reasons, and for those
whose ﬁxed-term contract ended and who had been employed at the same ﬁrm for
at least 36 months. Conditional on drafting an activation plan with a caseworker,
these workers became eligible for higher beneﬁts at rates r1 = 0.65 and r2 = 0.375
for 20 days of self-directed job search and for the duration of active labor market
programs speciﬁed in the activation plan. The maximum duration for this beneﬁt
increase was 185 days. Following this reform the increased beneﬁts could be paid on
the basis of a long work history or on the basis of ALMP participation (including
20 days for normal job search after the activation plan was signed).7
• In 2010, several changes were made as a part of a major reform. The maximum
duration of increased beneﬁts that could be paid during ALMPs was extended to
200 days. Those who fulﬁlled the requirements regarding previous work history and
the cause of unemployment could receive increased beneﬁts during ALMP at rates
r1 = 0.65 and r2 = 0.375 as before. In addition, increased beneﬁts were also paid
during ALMPs to unemployed who did not ﬁll the aforementioned requirements but
at lower rates of r1 = 0.575 and r2 = 0.35. The maximum duration for the increase
7As of 2005 it was possible that an unemployed worker would ﬁrst receive increased beneﬁts based on
a long work history for 150 days, and after that also receive increased beneﬁts for participating in labor
market programs for 185 days (i.e. the maximum durations would add up to 335 days). However, if the
worker was simultaneously entitled to both types of increased rates, then each payment day would count
towards both limits.
7
based on a work history of at least 20 years was reduced to 100 days. At the same
time, the wage range covered by the higher rate of r1 was enlarged (w
∗ increased
due to an increase of k from 90 to 105) and the increased rates based on a long
work history were increased to r1 = 0.575 and r2 = 0.35. These increased rates were
also extended to beneﬁt recipients who had been working for at least three years
albeit only for a maximum duration of 20 days. Lastly, the automatic entitlement to
increased rates was removed from the recipients of extended beneﬁts (thus undoing
the change made in 2003).
• In 2012, the level of the base part b was increased by approximately 17% on top of
the normal index-based adjustment.
• In 2014, the diﬀerent categories of increased beneﬁts were simpliﬁed. Now the
increased beneﬁts were paid at the same rates r1 = 0.65 and r2 = 0.375 for both
ALMP participation (for a maximum duration of 200 days, as before the reform)
and long work history (for a maximum duration of 90 days, 10 days less than
before). Increased beneﬁts during ALMP participation were paid at the same rate
regardless of work history or cause of unemployment. Lastly, the 20-day increase
for unemployed workers with shorter work histories was removed.
• In 2015, the wage threshold w∗ was reduced back to 95 times the base part and the
rates for increased beneﬁts were dropped to r1 = 0.58 and r2 = 0.35.
• Since the beginning of 2017, increased beneﬁts are only paid to unemployed workers
who participate in certain ALMPs, which means that a long work history alone does
not qualify a worker for increased beneﬁts anymore. At the same time, the rates for
increased beneﬁts were reduced to r1 = 0.55 and r2 = 0.25.
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Figure 2: Monthly UI beneﬁts (upper panel) and replacement rates (lower panel) for
diﬀerent past monthly wages during 20002017. Each curve represents a period of time
between major reforms, and the base part of the beneﬁt has been adjusted with the
National Pensions Index (using year 2017 as the baseline).
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As seen in the upper panel of ﬁgure 2, the 2002 change in r1 made the beneﬁt proﬁle
steeper up to the wage threshold w∗. The increase in the base part in 2012 raised the
UI beneﬁt for all levels of the past wage, i.e. shifted the beneﬁt proﬁle upwards. The
changes in the wage threshold in 2010 and 2015 only aﬀected workers with relatively high
past wages. Namely the 2010 increase raised beneﬁts of workers with the past wage above
the old threshold, whereas the 2015 decline caused a fall in beneﬁt levels for all recipients
above the new wage threshold. The corresponding changes in the replacement rates are
shown in the lower panel of ﬁgure 2. In summary, the beneﬁt levels were generally rising
until 2014, with much larger beneﬁt hikes directed to high wage workers. This trend was
reversed in 2015 when only the highest beneﬁts were cut.
The eﬀect of increased beneﬁts on the replacement rate over the unemployment spell
in diﬀerent years is illustrated in ﬁgure 3. The replacement rate is calculated for a worker
whose past monthly wage was 2500 Euros and who is eligible for both types of beneﬁt
increases when available. We assume that the worker ﬁrst receives a higher beneﬁt due to
a long work history for the maximum time, after which he or she participates in ALMPs
that qualify for a higher beneﬁt for the maximum time. The increase based on a long
work history became available in 2003, raising the replacement rates of eligible workers
for a maximum of 150 days as shown in the left panel of ﬁgure 3. Subsequently in 2005,
participation in ALMPs made an unemployed job seeker eligible for increased beneﬁts at
a higher rate for 185 days provided the other eligibility criteria described above were also
met. The increase in the base part resulted in a general upward shift in the replacement
rates in 2012. The beneﬁts based on a long work history and ALMP participation were
paid at diﬀerent rates (the rates for ALMP participation being higher) until 2014, when
the rates were set at the same level. 2014 is also the year when the increased beneﬁts were
the most generous. After this, the rates were cut in 2015 and 2017, and the work history
based increase was removed altogether in 2017, as shown in the right panel of ﬁgure 3.
2.3.2 Partial Beneﬁts
UI recipients who take up a full-time job for less than two weeks or a part-time job (up
to 80% of full-time work hours) may qualify for partial beneﬁts. Since the introduction of
the earnings disregard (suojaosa) in 2014, the level of the partial beneﬁt has been based
in the following way on the full beneﬁt the person would otherwise receive: earnings up to
300 Euros a month are disregarded, so a person earning below 300 Euros a month would
still receive full beneﬁts. For higher earnings, all income above 300 Euros reduces beneﬁts
by 50% of the earned amount. For example, earning 1300 Euros a month would reduce
monthly beneﬁts by 500 Euros. In either case, the total amount of beneﬁts and additional
income cannot exceed the recipient's pre-unemployment earnings.
11
0
.5
0
.6
0
.7
0
.8
0
.9
0
5
0
1
0
0
1
5
0
2
0
0
2
5
0
3
0
0
3
5
0
4
0
0
4
5
0
5
0
0
Replacement rate 
U
n
e
m
p
lo
ym
e
n
t 
d
u
ra
ti
o
n
 (
d
ay
s)
 
 2
0
1
0
-2
0
1
1 
 2
0
0
5
-2
0
09
*
 
2
0
0
3
-2
0
04
* 
 2
0
1
2
-2
0
13
 
0
.5
0
.6
0
.7
0
.8
0
.9
0
5
0
1
0
0
1
5
0
2
0
0
2
5
0
3
0
0
3
5
0
4
0
0
4
5
0
5
0
0
Replacement rate 
U
n
e
m
p
lo
ym
e
n
t 
d
u
ra
ti
o
n
 (
d
ay
s)
 
B
as
ed
 o
n
 w
o
rk
 h
is
to
ry
A
LM
P
 p
ar
ti
ci
p
at
io
n
 2
0
1
7
 
2
0
1
5
-2
0
16
 
 2
0
1
2
-2
0
13
 
 2
0
1
4
 
F
ig
u
re
3:
R
ep
la
ce
m
en
t
ra
te
s
w
it
h
in
cr
ea
se
d
b
en
eﬁ
ts
d
u
ri
n
g
20
03
2
01
7
(2
00
3
20
13
in
th
e
le
ft
p
an
el
,
20
12
-2
01
7
in
th
e
ri
gh
t
p
an
el
)
fo
r
a
p
er
so
n
w
h
os
e
p
as
t
m
on
th
ly
w
ag
e
w
as
25
00
E
u
ro
s
an
d
w
h
o
is
el
ig
ib
le
fo
r
b
en
eﬁ
t
in
cr
ea
se
s
d
u
e
to
b
ot
h
a
lo
n
g
w
or
k
h
is
to
ry
(r
ec
ei
ve
d
ﬁ
rs
t
fo
r
th
e
m
ax
im
u
m
p
er
io
d
)
an
d
A
L
M
P
p
ar
ti
ci
p
at
io
n
(r
ec
ei
ve
d
th
er
ea
ft
er
fo
r
th
e
m
ax
im
u
m
p
er
io
d
).
T
h
e
b
en
eﬁ
t
le
ve
ls
u
se
d
in
ca
lc
u
la
ti
n
g
th
e
re
p
la
ce
m
en
t
ra
te
s
h
av
e
b
ee
n
ad
ju
st
ed
u
si
n
g
th
e
N
at
io
n
al
P
en
si
on
s
In
d
ex
to
th
e
20
17
le
ve
l.
∗)
B
ef
or
e
20
10
th
e
tr
ai
n
in
g
su
b
si
d
y
(e
q
u
al
to
th
e
U
I
b
en
eﬁ
t)
w
as
re
ce
iv
ed
d
u
ri
n
g
A
L
M
P
s,
an
d
h
en
ce
p
ro
gr
am
p
ar
ti
ci
p
at
io
n
ex
te
n
d
ed
th
e
m
ax
im
u
m
p
er
io
d
of
ea
rn
in
gs
-r
el
at
ed
b
en
eﬁ
ts
b
y
th
e
le
n
gt
h
of
th
e
p
ro
gr
am
s.
12
The days on which partial beneﬁts are paid are not counted as full days towards the
maximum beneﬁt duration. Instead, a day on partial beneﬁts counts as a fraction of a
day corresponding to the ratio of the partial beneﬁt level to the equivalent full beneﬁt
level. For example, for a person receiving partial beneﬁts that are 50% of the full beneﬁts
he or she would be entitled to, one day on partial beneﬁts counts as 0.5 days towards the
maximum duration.
Another important consideration is that work done while receiving partial beneﬁts
also counts towards the employment condition, provided that the weekly working time is
at least 18 hours. If the employment condition is fulﬁlled again while working on partial
beneﬁts, the UI beneﬁt level will be recalculated using the more recent wage income. This
may result in beneﬁt level dropping after the readjustment, although extreme changes are
prevented by a rule which says that the adjusted beneﬁt level must be at least 80% of the
old level.
Since 1997, there have only been relatively minor adjustments in the partial beneﬁts:8
• In 2003, the maximum length of a temporary full-time job qualifying for partial
beneﬁts was reduced from four weeks to the current two weeks.
• In 2012, the maximum working hours limit for a part-time job was increased to
the current 80% of full-time hours from the previous 75%. In particular, this made
employees who are working on a reduced four-day week eligible for partial beneﬁts.
• In 2014, the earnings disregard for income below 300 Euros a month was introdu-
ced (previously all earnings aﬀected the beneﬁt level). Additionally, the maximum
combined amount of partial beneﬁts and wage income was increased to 100% of the
pre-unemployment wage level (previously 90%).
Overall income for the part-time unemployed consisting of partial beneﬁts and wage in-
come is illustrated for diﬀerent pre-unemployment wages and wage incomes while part-
time unemployed (as a percentage of the pre-unemployment monthly wage) before and
after the 2014 reform in ﬁgure 4. The introduction of the earnings disregard increased the
beneﬁt level for all partial beneﬁt claimants whose total income was not already capped
by the maximum limit, shifting beneﬁt levels and replacement rates upwards compared
to the purple baseline curve. The resulting change in the replacement rate was approx-
imately 0.1 or slightly less for most wage levels. For example, the replacement rate for
a person who used to earn 2500 Euros a month and now got 50% of that increased from
0.855 to 0.945. The increase in the maximum total income cap from 90% to 100% of
the claimant's previous wage also had a notable eﬀect on beneﬁt levels and replacement
8A description of the earlier history can be found in Haataja (2007).
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Figure 4: Income levels and replacement rates before and after the 2014 reform for a
part-time unemployed person who is eligible for partial UI beneﬁts, and whose current
wage is either 25%, 50%, or 75% of his or her previous wage. The beneﬁt formulas have
been adjusted to 2017 prices using the National Pensions Index.
rates. This can be seen in ﬁgure 4, which shows in the bottom left panel that the 90% cap
is binding for a relatively large range of wage levels. This is especially true for workers
with a relatively high wage during part-time unemployment (75% of their previous wage,
illustrated by the green lines in the ﬁgures), for whom the cap was binding for wages up
to 3800 Euros under the 2013 rules.
2.4 Beneﬁt Duration
There have been only a few major changes related to beneﬁt duration in the period
20002017:
• In 2010, a speciﬁc training subsidy (koulutustuki) that was paid for the duration of
labor market programs was abolished. Since this reform, the program participants
have been receiving UI beneﬁts and thereby the days spent in labor market training
14
started counting towards the duration limit. Previously, participation in ALMPs
postponed the day of the UI beneﬁt exhaustion by the length of the program period.
As there was no upper limit for days spent in labor market training, it used to
be technically possible for an unemployed person to receive beneﬁts indeﬁnitely by
participating repeatedly in diﬀerent training programs. In the same reform, another
training subsidy (koulutuspäiväraha) was abolished. This subsidy allowed workers
with at least ten years of work history to participate in more extensive vocational
training for up to 500 days. Eligible workers could receive this subsidy and regular
UI beneﬁts up to a maximum of 565 days (113 weeks).
• In 2014, the maximum duration of earnings-related UI beneﬁts was reduced from
500 to 400 days (from 100 to 80 weeks) for workers with a work history shorter than
three years. These workers were, however, entitled to a beneﬁt payment equal to
the basic unemployment allowance for an additional 100 days after the 400 days of
earnings-related UI beneﬁts.
• At the beginning of 2017, the maximum beneﬁt durations were reduced to 400 days
(80 weeks) for most workers and to 300 days (60 weeks) for workers with a work
history shorter than three years. Workers aged 58 or above with at least ﬁve years
of work history in the last twenty years were exempt from this change, so that the
maximum beneﬁt duration for them remained at 500 days (100 weeks).
The oldest UI recipients can receive beneﬁts until retirement. Namely, workers who are at
least 61 years old (and have been working for at least ﬁve years in the last twenty years)
when they reach their 500-day beneﬁt limit qualify for extended beneﬁts which can be
received until entitlement to an old-age pension begins. As the age is checked only on
the day when the regular beneﬁts expire, the rule generally applies to people who become
unemployed at the age of 59 (and 1 month) or later. The age limit at which the UI beneﬁt
payments can be extended until retirement has increased gradually from 57 to 59 years
in 2005 (aﬀecting workers born in or after 1950), to 60 years in 2012 (born in or after
1955), and to the current 61 years in 2015 (born in or after 1957). Long-term unemployed
workers born before 1950 have also been entitled to an unemployment pension from age
60. This beneﬁt was abolished in 2005 but only from later cohorts. The combination of
regular and extended UI beneﬁts is known as the unemployment tunnel (UT) scheme.
The changes in the age limit of this scheme are summarized in ﬁgure 5.
2.5 Overall Beneﬁt Generosity
We reported beneﬁt levels and replacement rates for various levels of past earnings above.
What the actual beneﬁts and replacements rates are depend on the distribution of past
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1941 61 62 63
1942 60 61 62 63
1943 59 60 61 62 63
1944 58 59 60 61 62 63
1945 57 58 59 60 61 62 63
1946 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63
1947 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63
1948 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63
1949 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63
1950 57 58 59 60 61 62 63
1951 57 58 59 60 61 62 63
1952 57 58 59 60 61 62 63
1953 57 58 59 60 61 62 63
1954 57 58 59 60 61 62 63
1955 58 59 60 61 62
1956 58 59 60 61
1957 59 60
1958 59
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
Regular UI benefits for 
100 weeks
Extended UI benefits
until retirement
Unemployment pension 
for those born before 
1950
Figure 5: Eligibility for extended UI beneﬁts and unemployment pension by cohort and
year
earnings among the UI recipients. The beneﬁts also depend on the number of children,
receipt of some other beneﬁts which reduce UI beneﬁts, and prevalence of part-time
working. To illustrate the distribution of realized replacement rates ﬁgure 6 displays
kernel density estimates of replacement rates of UI beneﬁts in 2003, 2008 and 2013.
The data used are from the Insurance Supervisory Authority (FIVA) and include
earnings-related unemployment beneﬁts (see the appendix on data sources).9 The repla-
cement rates are calculated for unemployment spells at the end of September each year.
Some of the replacement rates are very low considering the beneﬁt schedule. This is
partly due to the fact that other beneﬁts such as home care allowance when taking care
of children as well as partial disability pension can lower the UI beneﬁt an unemployed
worker is entitled to. In addition, the partial unemployment beneﬁts described above will
be lower than the full beneﬁt amount for a given wage (when excluding the wage from
the part-time or temporary job).
In general, the daily beneﬁt cannot exceed 90% of the underlying daily wage which
restricts the beneﬁt amount at low levels of earnings and shows up as a bump at the
90% replacement rate in the kernel density estimates. Replacement rates above 90% are
possible for those who are entitled to increased beneﬁts based on a long work history
and other criteria detailed above. Replacement rates around 60% are the most prevalent
9Job alternation compensation is excluded from ﬁgure 6. Job alternation compensation can be claimed
by an employee for the duration of job alternation leave (vuorotteluvapaa) if his or her employer employs
an unemployed job seeker for the duration of the leave.
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Figure 6: Kernel density estimates of replacement rates
in all three years. The increase in mass for replacement rates between 40% and 60% in
2008 compared to the 2003 situation is due to diﬀerences in the distribution of previous
wages of unemployed job seekers between the two years. In 2008 a much larger share of
unemployed had previous wages above the wage threshold w∗, i.e. a larger share had UI
beneﬁts calculated based on the lower rate r1 as described in section 2.3. In 2010 the wage
threshold was increased, which lead to a decrease in the share of unemployed with wages
above the threshold. This shows up as a decreased mass at replacement rates below 60%
in 2013 compared to the situation in 2008.
The changes in the unemployment insurance system described above have led to both
increases and decreases in the generosity of the system over the years. As discussed in
the previous sections, the changes have also aﬀected job seekers diﬀerently based on their
work history, age and past wage level. In order to better assess how the generosity of
the system has changed overall, we use a reference population to calculate the average
maximum beneﬁt amount available using the beneﬁt rules in eﬀect in years 2000 to 2017.
We use data on unemployment spells in 2009 for employees who started their spell in
full-time unemployment receiving either UI beneﬁts or labor market subsidy.10 Additio-
nally we require that the previous job lasted no less than four weeks and ended within
10See the appendix for data sources.
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four weeks prior to the beneﬁt claim (this eliminates voluntary quits). We also limit the
data to individuals who were in the labor force for at least 90% of the time during the
last 28 months without being self-employed or hired with a wage subsidy and who were a
member of an unemployment fund for at least 28 months. These restrictions are imposed
in order to improve the accuracy of our measure of contribution weeks for the employment
condition.
Figure 7 displays the average of the maximum available UI beneﬁts for our reference
population. The maximum duration is calculated assuming full take up of training be-
neﬁts, which extended the duration to 565 days for job seekers with at least ten years of
work history prior to 2010. In addition, the separate training subsidy which was available
prior to 2010 is assumed to extend the duration with the average of training subsidy days
in the whole population, i.e. 2.9 days.11 For unemployed close to retirement, extended
beneﬁts are assumed to be claimed until age 63 with the eligibility to extended beneﬁts
changing during our observation period. The level of beneﬁts is calculated assuming also
full take-up of increased beneﬁts based on a long work history and participation in labor
market programs. The duration of increased beneﬁts due to ALMP participation is assu-
med to be the maximum available duration. The fulﬁllment of the employment condition
is calculated using contribution weeks. For those who do not fulﬁll the employment con-
dition but have unused UI beneﬁt days from a previous spell, the duration is adjusted to
match the share of unused days. As we are focusing on earnings-related UI beneﬁts, we
set the beneﬁt level to 0 for those who do not fulﬁll the employment condition and do not
have unused UI beneﬁt days left from the previous spell, and for those who have already
received earnings-related UI beneﬁts for the maximum duration during the current spell.
Figure 7 shows that the UI beneﬁt system became more generous on average between
2000 and 2014 and since then the average maximum beneﬁt amount has been decreasing.
In 2017 the average of the maximum available UI beneﬁts is back at its year 2000 level.
The largest increase in the average maximum beneﬁt amount during this period took place
in 2003 when the employment condition was relaxed and unemployed workers with long
work histories became entitled to increased beneﬁts. This raised the averaged maximum
beneﬁt amount by 17%. It should be noted that the severance pay system that was in
eﬀect prior to 2003 is not included in the calculations. There was a notable increase also
in 2014 when the marginal rate for increased beneﬁts was raised and the employment
condition was further relaxed. Between 2014 and 2017 the average maximum beneﬁt
amount has decreased by 25% due to reductions in beneﬁt duration and an increase in
the age limit of extended beneﬁts.
115.5% of the spells in our sample include days on training subsidy and conditional on receiving training
subsidy the average number of training subsidy days is 52.
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Figure 7: Average maximum UI beneﬁt amounts by year
We examine these changes in more detail in ﬁgure 8 which shows the average of the
maximum available UI beneﬁts calculated separately for unemployed with less than 3, 3
to 19 and 20 or over years of work history. The changes to the employment condition,
beneﬁt level and beneﬁt duration are presented in separate graphs and then combined to
illustrate the overall changes. The changes in the employment condition and the beneﬁt
level have contributed to increasing the average maximum beneﬁt amounts whereas the
changes in the UI beneﬁt duration have had a negative impact.
The top left graph in ﬁgure 8 displays the impact of the employment condition holding
the UI beneﬁt level and duration constant at their year 2000 levels. In 2000 the diﬀerences
in the average maximum beneﬁt amounts between the groups with diﬀerent amounts
of work history were due to diﬀerences in the wages used for calculating the earnings-
related beneﬁts and diﬀerences in the shares of employees who fulﬁlled the employment
condition and those who were entitled to extended beneﬁts. The reduction in 2003 of the
employment condition for unemployed workers who had received unemployment beneﬁts
in the past shows up clearly in the ﬁgure. The increase in the share of unemployed who
qualify for earnings-related UI beneﬁts increases the average maximum beneﬁt amount.
The 2010 reduction in the employment condition of ﬁrst time beneﬁt claimants hardly
shows up in the ﬁgure, as our sample includes very few ﬁrst time unemployed with 34 to
19
43 contribution weeks. However, the 2014 reduction of the employment condition for all
unemployed increases the maximum beneﬁt amount notably in all three groups.
The top right graph in ﬁgure 8 shows the impact of changes in the UI beneﬁt level
holding the employment condition and beneﬁt duration constant at year 2000 levels. The
ﬁrst change is apparent in 2002, when the base part was increased and the marginal rate
for lower wages increased from 0.42 to 0.45, thereby increasing the average maximum
beneﬁt amounts in all groups. In 2003 unemployed workers with long work histories be-
came eligible for increased beneﬁts at the beginning of their unemployment spell and for
the duration of extended beneﬁts after their regular beneﬁts were expired. As mentioned
above, the calculations do not take into account the availability of severance pay prior to
2003. However, as seen from the decomposition of the 2003 rise in the average maximum
beneﬁt level, the bulk of the increase is explained by the more lenient employment condi-
tion. In 2005 those with at least three years of work history became eligible for increased
beneﬁts for the duration of ALMPs. Both the 2003 and 2005 increases show up as a rise
in the average beneﬁt amount for the relevant group.
In 2010 there were increases in beneﬁt levels in all groups as those with less than
three years of work history became eligible for increased beneﬁts at the beginning of their
unemployment spell, the increase for over 20 years of work history was raised slightly and
all workers participating in ALMPs or studies (if agreed with their case worker) became
eligible for an increase for 200 days. The increase that was paid on top of regular UI
beneﬁts to those receiving extended beneﬁts was abolished in 2010. The 2012 increase in
the base part shows up as a jump in the average maximum beneﬁt amount in all groups.
In 2014 the marginal rate of increased beneﬁts based on a long work history and during
ALMPs was increased before being reduced again in 2015. These changes are visible as
slight upward and downward shifts in the average maximum beneﬁt amounts. The last
decreases in the levels of average maximum beneﬁts in 2017 are due to the abolition of
the beneﬁt increase for those with a long work history and the decrease in the marginal
rate for increased beneﬁts during ALMPs.
The bottom left graph in ﬁgure 8 displays the impact of changes in the UI beneﬁt
duration holding the employment condition and UI beneﬁt level constant at the year
2000 levels. For those with less than 20 years of work history the ﬁrst change is the
removal of the training subsidy in 2010, which eﬀectively reduced the maximum duration
of earnings-related unemployment beneﬁts. Also the reductions in beneﬁt duration by
100 days for those with less than three years of work history in 2014 and for all groups
in 2017 decrease the average maximum beneﬁt amount. For the group with 20 or more
years of work history, the beneﬁt duration and hence also the average maximum beneﬁt
amount starts decreasing in 2005 due to increases in the age limits for extended beneﬁts.
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The bottom right graph in ﬁgure 8 illustrates the combined impact of the changes in the
diﬀerent elements of the UI system on the average maximum beneﬁt amounts. Comparing
the situation in 2000 to 2017, the negative impact of decreases in the beneﬁt duration
undoes the positive impact of changes in the employment condition and beneﬁt levels
for the group with less than three years of work history leaving their average maximum
available beneﬁt almost unchanged. For those with 3 to 19 years of work history, the
positive impact of the changes in the employment condition and beneﬁt levels dominate
and the average maximum beneﬁt amount remains over 20% higher than in 2000 despite
the sharp decrease due to the reduction in beneﬁt duration in 2017. Unemployed workers
with 20 or over years of work history have, however, experienced a 15% decrease in
the average maximum beneﬁt amount primarily due to the changes in the age limits of
extended beneﬁts.
The averages in ﬁgure 8 conceal the fact that within each group with diﬀerent work
history, there are both winners and losers in terms of maximum available UI beneﬁt
amounts. Unemployed workers who were not entitled to earnings-related UI beneﬁts in
2000 but are eligible for them in 2017 due to the more lenient employment condition, have
all gained compared to the situation in 2000. This raises the averages in each group. The
majority of those who were eligible for earnings-related UI already in 2000 are entitled
to less UI beneﬁts in 2017. The biggest losers in terms of maximum available UI beneﬁts
are older unemployed who are no longer entitled to extended beneﬁts due to increases in
the age limits.
3 Theoretical Background
This section provides a brief look at the economic theory of UI along with some references
of relevant empirical ﬁndings. Our discussion relies heavily on reviews by Holmlund (1998;
2015), Fredriksson and Holmlund (2006), Tatsiramos and van Ours (2014), Gruber (2011),
Chetty and Finkelstein (2013) and Schmieder et al. (2016).
3.1 Key Issues of UI
In economics a widely accepted idea is that individuals prefer a stable path of consump-
tion. Thus, when income is aﬀected by transitory shocks, like unemployment, workers
desire consumption smoothing. In other words, workers are willing give up some part of
their consumption when employed for an increase in consumption when out of work. To
some extent workers may be able to smooth their consumption over unemployment and
employment spells by using savings and borrowing. This is called self-insurance. In
practice, self-insurance is likely to be ineﬃcient and incomplete for a variety of reasons.
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First, an important limitation is that credit markets are imperfect in the sense that it is
diﬃcult or impossible for unemployed workers to borrow against future wage income to
be spent on consumption over long periods of unemployment. Second, layoﬀs are diﬃcult
to forecast and the duration of unemployment spells is not known in advance. Because
of this uncertainty, individuals would probably save either too much or too little to cover
the costs of future layoﬀs, depending on how often they lose their jobs and how long
their unemployment spells last. Third, unemployment can result in large income losses
especially during recessions. At least for low-income families it would be diﬃcult to accu-
mulate suﬃcient amounts of savings to cover such losses even if the timing and length of
unemployment spells were known in advance. For all these reasons workers' possibilities
to self-insure against unemployment are rather limited.
The fact that unemployed workers cannot freely borrow against future wage income is a
market failure. As a result, many unemployed with no savings are liquidity constrained
and hence at risk of experiencing a large drop in consumption which would lead to a
large welfare loss. In the presence of perfect credit markets, individuals would be able to
perfectly smooth their consumption over unemployment and employment spells, in which
case there would be less need for unemployment insurance.12
The UI program is a form of social insurance that pools risk across diﬀerent individuals
and provides insurance against income losses due to involuntary job separations. To some
extent the UI program just crowds out self-insurance because workers save less to oﬀset the
negative income eﬀect of job losses when they are insured against such events. However,
to the extent the UI program provides extra consumption smoothing that would not have
been possible without the unemployment beneﬁts it enhances eﬃciency and increases
welfare.13
Unemployment beneﬁts enable workers to maintain their consumption at a reasonable
level during a period of ﬁnancial diﬃculty. As such, the beneﬁts allow unemployed workers
to stay out of work longer and search for a suitable job. This leads to longer spells
of unemployment, but that is not necessarily a bad thing. It takes some time for an
12The need for government intervention in providing UI is a distinct question. In principle, workers
could buy UI plans from the private insurance markets. However, there are reasons why private UI would
be problematic in practice. Perhaps the most important one is asymmetric information: workers know
more about their unemployment risk than the insurer. This would lead to the problem of adverse selection
and under insurance in some worker groups, yet another type of private market failure. Another problem
is that unemployment risks are highly correlated over time. It follows that private insurers might go into
bankruptcy during recessions when a lot of workers are laid oﬀ at the same time. Other arguments for
public UI include redistribution (the government wishes to tax workers with a low unemployment risk in
order to subsidize high-risk workers) and paternalism (the government may want force workers to take
a suﬃcient insurance for their own good). See Gruber (2011) and Chetty and Finkelstein (2013) for a
more detailed discussion on the motivations for public UI.
13Gruber (1997), Browning and Crossley (2001) and Bentolila and Ichino (2008) provide empirical
evidence on the eﬀect of UI on consumption smoothing.
23
unemployed worker to ﬁnd a vacant job that fully utilizes his or her skills. In such a job the
worker is more productive and earns a higher wage than in some less appropriate job. Also
society gains from a higher output from the worker's eﬀort. Thus longer unemployment
spells are not necessarily undesirable if they lead to better matches between job seekers and
vacant jobs. However, UI beneﬁts also indirectly subsidize leisure, distorting the incentive
to work and thus inducing moral hazard.14 Beneﬁt recipients may therefore search less
intensively for a new job than they would without such beneﬁts. The UI system can
also induce layoﬀs and quits by distorting the behavior of employed workers and their
employers. All in all, a more generous UI program is likely to increase the unemployment
inﬂow and reduce the unemployment outﬂow, leading to higher unemployment.
If adverse behavior of workers and employers could be directly observed, it might be
possible to eliminate the moral hazard problems by means of monitoring and sanctions,
and provide full insurance against income losses due to unemployment. Since comprehen-
sive monitoring is not feasible in practice, the UI programs provide only partial insurance.
In designing the UI system the policy makers must strike a balance between the welfare
gains of the insurance provided and the costs of adverse incentive eﬀects on labor supply
and demand.
In the next section we discuss the incentive eﬀects of UI beneﬁts using a stylized job
search model. This model makes predictions on how changes in the beneﬁt level and
maximum beneﬁt duration aﬀect the re-employment probability over the course of the
unemployment spell. Then we discuss various departures from this simpliﬁed framework
which are relevant for understanding the eﬀects of UI in a wider context as well as for
interpreting our subsequent empirical ﬁndings. Finally, we brieﬂy discuss the literature on
the optimal design of UI which aims to determine the optimal level of beneﬁt generosity
and how the UI scheme should be structured.
3.2 Incentive Eﬀects in a Job Search Model
In the economic literature, unemployment insurance is commonly analyzed by using va-
rious job search models. These models have shed light on how UI beneﬁts can aﬀect
unemployment duration through the search eﬀort and reservation wage. The seminal
contribution of this literature is Mortensen (1977) who incorporated some key institu-
tional features of UI that are also found in the Finnish scheme into the analysis of the
incentive eﬀects. In his model, only workers who are laid oﬀ qualify for UI, and the be-
neﬁts can be received only for a limited period of time. These assumptions correspond to
14The UI program also leads to higher labor taxes (i.e. insurance premiums paid by ﬁrms and workers)
that are needed to ﬁnance the beneﬁts to the unemployed. The higher tax rate further contributes to the
disincentive to work.
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a one-day employment condition and an inﬁnite waiting period for those who quit their
job voluntary.
Workers cannot save, nor borrow. When employed the worker faces an exogenous
risk of being laid oﬀ. When unemployed the worker chooses optimal search eﬀort and
samples job oﬀers from some known distribution. The unemployment spell ends when the
worker receives an oﬀer that exceeds a given reservation wage. The job ﬁnding rate 
the probability of re-employment at a given point in the unemployment spell conditional
on being unemployed until that point  increases with search eﬀort (as the arrival rate
of job oﬀers increases) and decreases with the reservation wage (as the probability that a
received oﬀer is acceptable declines).
When the beneﬁt recipient takes up a new job, the beneﬁt payments are terminated.
The expected amount of foregone beneﬁt payments is the larger, the longer the remaining
beneﬁt entitlement at the time of re-employment is. A consequence is that the value of
continued search as unemployed in comparison to that of re-employment decreases over
the course of the compensated part of the unemployment spell. It follows that at the
beginning of the unemployment spell the worker searchers with a relatively low intensity
and accepts only relatively high wage oﬀers. As the worker approaches the date when the
beneﬁts will expire, the search eﬀort increases and the reservation wage decreases. After
the exhaustion of the beneﬁts, the worker faces a stationary environment, and hence the
search eﬀort and reservation wage do not change anymore. The job ﬁnding rate therefore
increases up to the point of beneﬁt exhaustion and remains constant thereafter, as shown
in ﬁgure 9.15
An important institutional feature in the model is that only laid oﬀ workers are eligible
for UI. All workers, irrespective of their current employment status, know that with a
positive probability they will be laid oﬀ in the future in which case they will qualify for
UI beneﬁts. This implies that more generous beneﬁts do not only increase the value of
unemployment for current beneﬁt recipients but also the value of being unemployed in
the future and hence the value of obtaining a job. While the former eﬀect increases the
incentive to remain unemployed for current beneﬁt recipients, the latter  the entitlement
eﬀect  makes re-employment more attractive for all unemployed, including those who
are not currently eligible for the beneﬁts. The entitlement eﬀect is the only eﬀect aﬀecting
the non-recipients. The UI recipients are aﬀected by both eﬀects, which work in opposite
15Krueger and Mueller (2010) analyze time use survey data from the U.S. and ﬁnd that the time spent
in job search increases prior to beneﬁt exhaustion among UI recipients. They also ﬁnd that UI recipients
search less actively in the U.S. states with more generous beneﬁts. While these ﬁndings are consistent
with the predictions of the Mortensen's search model, the ﬁnding that the search eﬀort declines after
the beneﬁt exhaustion rather than remains constant is not. The last ﬁnding is, however, in accordance
with a common observation that the job ﬁnding rate often exhibits a spike around the time of beneﬁt
exhaustion. We return to this issues in section 4.3.
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Figure 9: Job ﬁnding rate at diﬀerent stages of unemployment. The expiration of UI
beneﬁts is marked by the point T .
directions, but the entitlement eﬀect dominates close to the beneﬁt exhaustion.
Because of the entitlement eﬀect, the eﬀect of an improvement in beneﬁt generosity
on the job ﬁnding rate changes its sign from negative to positive over the course of
the unemployment spell. The eﬀect of an increase in the beneﬁt level is largest at the
beginning of the unemployment, leading to a steeper job ﬁnding rate over the compensated
part of the unemployment spell (the left panel in ﬁgure 10). The eﬀect of an increase in the
maximum beneﬁt duration is largest at the previous point of the beneﬁt exhaustion (the
right panel in ﬁgure 10). In both cases the new job ﬁnding rate after beneﬁt expiration is
higher due to the entitlement eﬀect, as getting re-employed and fulﬁlling the employment
condition for the next unemployment spell has become more valuable.
The expected duration of an unemployment spell is a function of the job ﬁnding
rate. Because of the entitlement eﬀect, the eﬀect of an improvement in beneﬁt generosity
on the expected unemployment duration is theoretically ambiguous. In practice, the
disincentive eﬀect is likely to be much stronger than the entitlement eﬀect, which is the
second-order eﬀect, reﬂecting the gains of fulﬁlling the employment condition for the next
unemployment spell. As such, higher beneﬁts and longer maximum beneﬁt duration are
expected to lead to longer spells of unemployment in a sample of new UI beneﬁt recipients.
This claim is supported by a large body of empirical evidence. We discuss this evidence
and present some new results for Finland in sections 4.2 and 4.3.
It should be stressed that the eﬀect of any change in beneﬁt generosity on the unem-
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Figure 10: Incentive eﬀects of an increase in the beneﬁt level (the left panel) and an
increase in the maximum beneﬁt duration from T to T ∗ (the right panel). The dashed
line is the job ﬁnding hazard after the change.
ployment duration of new UI recipients is associated with an opposite eﬀect on the unem-
ployment duration of ineligible workers, such as labor market entrants and those whose
beneﬁts have already expired. By implication, the overall negative eﬀect of UI beneﬁts
on the average unemployment duration is smaller than its eﬀect on the duration of new
UI spells.16
This simple model also provides some insights about the relative magnitude of the
eﬀects of the beneﬁt level and beneﬁt duration changes. If the average duration of UI spells
is short compared to the maximum beneﬁt duration, a change in the maximum beneﬁt
duration may have a relatively small impact on the average unemployment duration.
This is because the eﬀect of the beneﬁt duration change is largest at the original point
of the beneﬁt exhaustion and by that time most of the unemployed have already left
unemployment. This may be a relevant point when we consider the likely eﬀect of the
2017 reduction in the maximum beneﬁt duration because the maximum beneﬁt duration
is rather long in Finland and because most of the unemployment spells of UI recipients are
quite short. Unlike in the case of the beneﬁt duration change, a change in the beneﬁt level
is strongest at the beginning of the unemployment spell, aﬀecting all new UI recipients.17
16Levine (1993) shows that higher UI beneﬁts reduce the unemployment duration of those who are not
eligible for the beneﬁts. Valletta (2014) and Lalive et al. (2015) report similar spillover eﬀects for the
extensions of the UI beneﬁt periods.
17Schmieder et al. (2016) survey a large number of empirical estimates from the U.S. and Europe and
conclude that the unemployment duration elasticities with respect to the UI beneﬁt level are typically
somewhat higher than the elasticities with respect to the maximum beneﬁt duration. This is also what
we ﬁnd from Finnish data in sections 4.2 and 4.3.
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3.3 Other Potential Eﬀects
The search model above focuses on how the UI beneﬁts aﬀect the job ﬁnding rate. Obvi-
ously the model abstracts away many important aspects of the real-world labor market.
The UI system may aﬀect labor market outcomes through several other channels as well.
We list some possible eﬀects below.
Post-Unemployment Outcomes The adverse eﬀect of UI on unemployment duration
may at least partly be compensated by a positive eﬀect on subsequent job quality. Workers
and jobs are heterogeneous along many dimensions. A worker's productivity in any given
job depends on how well his or her skills match the requirements of the job. Therefore
it may be ineﬃcient to take the ﬁrst job oﬀered. Since UI beneﬁts allow unemployed
workers to search longer, more generous beneﬁts can lead to better matches between job
seekers and vacant jobs. In that sense UI beneﬁts can subsidize productive job search and
longer unemployment spells may not be a problem. This however requires that the search
eﬀort does not drop too much in response to more generous beneﬁts. Moreover, human
capital may depreciate during unemployment and employers can discriminate against
long-term unemployed.18 Thus the eﬀect of more generous beneﬁts on match quality can
also be negative, in which case the longer unemployment spells are less acceptable from
the viewpoint of the society. The match quality is diﬃcult to measure in practice but the
wage rate and job duration are commonly used proxies in empirical analysis. Empirical
evidence on the eﬀects of UI on these outcomes is mixed, as some studies ﬁnd no eﬀect
at all while others report small positive or small negative eﬀects. We report new results
for the eﬀects of UI beneﬁts on post-unemployment outcomes for Finland in sections 4.2
and 4.3.
Unemployment Inﬂow One concern is that UI may contribute to higher unemploy-
ment also by increasing the unemployment inﬂow. Employed workers who can qualify
for the beneﬁts may more easily quit. For this reason only workers who are laid oﬀ for
economic reasons are eligible for the beneﬁts in many countries, or there can be a long
waiting period for those who quit or who are ﬁred for cause (like in Finland). But these
restrictions do not necessarily eliminate the unemployment inﬂow eﬀect entirely: eligible
workers may work less hard on their current job (e.g. Wang and Williamson, 1996) or
18Kroft et al. (2013) test the latter hypothesis by sending a large number of ﬁctitious job applications
to open vacancies in the U.S. labor market. Most of these ﬁctitious applicants were assumed to have been
unemployed for various lengths of time. The authors ﬁnd that the likelihood of receiving a callback for
job interview declines with the length of the ongoing unemployment spell, and that this decline is stronger
when the local unemployment rate is low. These ﬁndings suggest that the employers use unemployment
duration as a signal of unemployed applicant's unobserved skills and motivation but recognize that this
signal is less informative during downturns.
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they may search less actively for alternative jobs (e.g. Light and Omori, 2004), both of
which increase their likelihood of becoming unemployed.
In some cases the distinction between voluntary and involuntary job separations can
be blurry. The employer and worker may mutually agree to terminate the employment
relationship in a layoﬀ. In Finland, this might be a relevant concern in the case of older
workers who can collect UI beneﬁts until retirement. Furthermore, a temporary worker
whose contract comes to an end may be less willing to sign a new one (at least with the old
wage rate) after satisfying the employment condition. These worries are supported by the
ﬁndings that the exit rate from work to unemployment increases when the employment
condition is met (in some other countries, not necessarily in Finland) as well as at the
age thresholds for extended beneﬁts. These ﬁndings give support for a suﬃciently long
waiting period to discourage unemployment entry. We analyze the unemployment inﬂow
eﬀects and discuss previous empirical ﬁndings in sections 4.1 and 4.3.3.
Part-Time Unemployment The distinction between unemployment and employment
is not always clear-cut because individuals may work part time and collect UI beneﬁts at
the same time. In Finland, eligibility for UI requires that the claimant is searching for a
full-time job. However, an unemployed worker may qualify for a partial beneﬁt if he or she
takes up a part-time job (or a very short full-time job) when no full-time jobs are available.
Working part time in such a case can be very helpful, allowing the worker to accumulate
new skills and by providing contacts with potential employers and reducing the stigma
of being fully unemployed, and may therefore provide a stepping stone out of beneﬁts
to self-supporting employment. A potential problem is that the partial beneﬁts act as a
subsidy for part-time employment, which can make working part time on partial beneﬁts
a very attractive alternative to both full-time unemployment and full-time employment.
As such, the availability of partial beneﬁts can encourage unemployed workers to search
for subsidized part-time jobs at the expense of full-time jobs, which in turn may induce
ﬁrms to create such jobs. This calls for some restrictions on the use of partial beneﬁts.
Ek and Holmlund (2015) show that providing partial beneﬁts as part of the UI scheme
can increase welfare. We discuss empirical evidence on the eﬀects of partial beneﬁts on
unemployment duration in section 4.2.2.
Labor Force Participation Individuals do not only move between jobs and unem-
ployment but also in and out of the labor force. Higher UI beneﬁts may increase the
number of people who decide to engage in job search, increasing the ﬂow from inactivity
to unemployment (and possibly directly to employment). Moreover, exhaustion of UI
beneﬁts may encourage some unemployed to withdraw from the labor force rather than
to continue job search or accept lower wage oﬀers. More generous beneﬁts can reduce
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such withdrawals through the entitlement eﬀect, reducing the ﬂow from unemployment
to inactivity. This would lead to longer unemployment spells but a higher share of the
spells ending in employment.
The UI beneﬁts can also induce some individuals who are not truly interested in
working to claim beneﬁts, even though they must ﬁrst establish eligibility by working
for some time. Likewise, the availability of partial beneﬁts may encourage some workers
who are only interested in part-time work and thereby should not be eligible for UI to
claim beneﬁts. A suﬃciently long employment condition and job search monitoring should
reduce the risk of these kinds of adverse behavior.
Other Beneﬁt Schemes Unemployed workers who are not eligible for UI may qualify
for a labor market subsidy while all low-income families are eligible for social assistance
and housing allowance. As a result, depending on the household structure and the income
level of a possible spouse, family net income may depend little on whether the unemployed
individual is receiving UI beneﬁts or not, mitigating the incentive eﬀect of UI. This is more
likely to be the case for single parents and couples who both are out of work. While the
structure of UI schemes is relatively similar across countries, there are large diﬀerences
in secondary beneﬁts available for the unemployed. This suggests that the estimates of
the labor supply eﬀects of UI from diﬀerent countries may partly reﬂect cross-country
diﬀerences in other beneﬁt schemes, which should be kept in mind when comparing the
estimates from diﬀerent countries.
Monitoring and Sanctions Beneﬁt eligibility is conditional on active job search and
to some extent on participation in labor market programs, both of which involve some
monitoring. In Finland, a new beneﬁt claimant must meet a caseworker and sign an
activation plan shortly after the start of the beneﬁt period. The activation plan may
require participation in some activation measures at given time intervals. During the
beneﬁt period the unemployed worker must meet the caseworker (or be in contact by
phone) on a regular basis. In these meetings it is checked whether the activation plan
has been followed. Those unemployed who do not show up at the scheduled meetings,
who do not exhibit suﬃcient search activity, who reject a job oﬀer that is regarded as
suitable or who do not take part in the activation measures speciﬁed in their activation
plan may receive a sanction. The sanction can be a temporary beneﬁt cut or suspension
of beneﬁt payments altogether for some time. Under an eﬀective monitoring system com-
bined with suﬃciently harsh sanctions the incentive eﬀects of beneﬁt generosity would be
unimportant. Therefore, instead of making UI less generous, one alternative to minimize
the risk of moral hazard behavior is to monitor the behavior of the unemployed and im-
pose sanctions on those do not comply with the rules (see e.g. Fredriksson and Holmlund,
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2006 for a formal analysis). In practice, eﬀective and comprehensive monitoring of search
behavior is diﬃcult or impossible, and prohibitively costly.19 Nevertheless, it is advisable
to conduct monitoring up to some cost level.
Labor Market Programs In many countries, especially in other Nordic countries,
labor market policy involves a heavy stress on various labor market programs. These
programs are often targeted at the long-term unemployed who are approaching the end
of their beneﬁt entitlement period. Participation in such programs can postpone the
exhaustion day of the beneﬁts (like in the case of labor market training before 2010 in
Finland) or even provide a way of regaining eligibility for the beneﬁts (like in the case
of job placement programs). Using a job search model Carling et al. (1996) illustrate
how the existence of labor market programs can mitigate the incentive eﬀects of the
UI beneﬁts. They also ﬁnd a dramatic increase in the transition rate to labor market
programs around the time of beneﬁt exhaustion (yet they also ﬁnd a spike in the job
ﬁnding rate). On the other hand, if participation in the labor market programs is made
mandatory after a certain time spent in unemployment, such programs may also work as a
work-test provided they are not popular among the unemployed. There is some evidence
that the job ﬁnding rate increases prior to the start of mandatory labor market programs
(Black et al., 2003, Geerdsen, 2006, and Rosholm and Svarer, 2008), which gives support
for the idea that these programs work as a screening device.
Search Externalities In the search model above, an increase in beneﬁt generosity
decreases the average search activity of UI recipients (although the search eﬀort increases
among those close to the beneﬁt exhaustion) but increases the search intensity of non-
recipients through the entitlement eﬀect. Because the UI recipients search less actively,
the search of non-recipients may also become more productive as they face less competition
over the same vacant jobs (i.e. the likelihood of receiving a job oﬀer with the same search
eﬀort increases), which would further increase the job ﬁnding rate of the non-recipients.
This spillover eﬀect due to search externality comes on top of the entitlement eﬀect.
Analogously, when an UI recipient reduces his or her search eﬀort in response to a
general increase in UI beneﬁts, the negative eﬀect of a lower search eﬀort on the arrival rate
of job oﬀers can partly be mitigated by a reduction in the aggregate search eﬀort (provided
19The system of monitoring in conjunction with sanctions has two potential eﬀects. First, some unem-
ployed workers may increase their search intensity and lower their reservation wage in order to reduce
the risk of being caught from non-compliance. This eﬀect (ex ante or threat eﬀect) aﬀects those who
would not otherwise comply the rules regarding suﬃcient search activity and acceptable job oﬀers from
the start of the unemployment spell onwards. The second eﬀect (ex post eﬀect) is a change in behavior
after being exposed to a beneﬁt sanction. Busk (2016) presents evidence on the size of the latter eﬀect in
Finland. She ﬁnds that an ongoing sanction increases the exit rate to employment by 25% and the exit
rate to inactivity by 82% among UI recipients.
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that the search activity of non-recipients through the entitlement eﬀect does not increase
too much). That is, the recipient's search becomes more productive because all other
UI recipients also reduce their search activity. One consequence of search externalities is
that the eﬀect of a beneﬁt increase for a small group of UI recipients (say, for displaced
workers with suﬃciently long work histories) can be larger than the eﬀect of the same
beneﬁt increase for all UI recipients. Empirical estimates of the UI eﬀects are often based
on the analysis of reforms that aﬀected some small group of the unemployed. These
estimates may thus overstate the eﬀects of the large-scale reforms of similar changes in
the beneﬁts.
Labor Demand Because more generous UI beneﬁts reduce aggregate search intensity
and raise wage claims of UI recipients, it becomes harder for ﬁrms to ﬁll job vacancies,
especially low-paid positions. This increases hiring costs which can reduce labor demand.
Thus it is possible that unemployment will be higher under a generous UI scheme not
only because of lower aggregate search eﬀort but also because fewer jobs are created in the
economy. Note that a possible decline in labor demand resulting from an improvement in
UI generosity can worsen job ﬁnding possibilities of all unemployed, including those not
eligible for UI beneﬁts. On the other hand, UI may also encourage ﬁrms to invest in more
productive jobs, which would improve the composition of jobs in the economy. It follows
that more generous UI beneﬁts can result in a higher level of total output despite higher
unemployment (Acemoglu and Shimer, 1999, 2000).
Consumption Smoothing over the Business Cycle When the economy is hit by
a negative demand shock, UI beneﬁts mitigate its eﬀect on employment and output by
increasing private consumption. When more people lose their jobs and enter unemploy-
ment, aggregate wage income falls but the beneﬁt payments automatically increase. The
beneﬁts compensate part of the wage losses of the unemployed, helping them maintain
their purchasing power and thus increasing spending. Provided that the timing of UI
ﬁnancing is procyclical, an increase in the beneﬁt payments during a recession stimulates
the economy at the time when it is most needed.20 This way the UI system helps to
break the spiral where increased unemployment decreases consumption, which leads to
a further decline in domestic demand. In other words, the UI system functions as an
automatic stabilizer. Thus, while a generous UI system is likely to increase the level of
unemployment, it may decrease the volatility of unemployment over the business cycle
(for empirical evidence see Di Maggio and Kermani, 2016, and references therein).
20Even if the UI program were funded on a period-by-period basis, this stimulation eﬀect may exist,
albeit it would be weaker. This is so because propensity to consume is likely to be higher for unemployed
than employed workers as low-income individuals typically consume a higher share of their income.
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UI Financing and Layoﬀs A large fraction of UI spells end in a recall, i.e. the worker
returns to the previous employer. These spells include temporary layoﬀs where the worker
is laid oﬀ without terminating the employment contract as well as the cases where the
worker is rehired by the same employer after a dismissal or the termination of a ﬁxed-
term contract. The large number of recalls raises the question whether UI induces ﬁrms
to lay oﬀ their workers more easily during periods of slack demand. UI beneﬁts increase
the likelihood that a worker on temporary layoﬀ will still be unemployed at the time of
recall. Without such beneﬁts the worker would look more actively for another job and
hence the ﬁrm would face a higher risk of losing the worker during a temporary layoﬀ.
This is a serious risk when the worker has some valuable ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital. The
same logic applies to ﬁrms that frequently rehire the same workers for short periods using
ﬁxed-term contracts.
Moreover, when employers contribute to ﬁnancing the UI system by paying ﬂat-rate
premiums, ﬁrms with high layoﬀ rates are implicitly subsidized by ﬁrms with low layoﬀ
rates. This is because the former ﬁrms pay relatively little to the UI system in comparison
to the amount of the beneﬁts received by their employees, whereas the opposite is true for
the latter ﬁrms. This may induce some ﬁrms to use (temporary) layoﬀs more extensively
than they would, had they been fully or partially responsible for the UI costs of their
employees (Feldstein, 1976).
It follows that the UI system subsidizes ﬁrms operating in sectors that are subject
to large economic ﬂuctuations or seasonal variation. In a sense the UI system pools the
risk of negative demand shocks across ﬁrms by lowering the layoﬀ costs of the ﬁrms hit
by a negative shock. The cost of this risk sharing, a kind of the moral hazard eﬀect, is
the excess use of layoﬀs. This corresponds to pooling the risk of earnings losses due to
unemployment across workers. It is worth emphasizing that the welfare gain of UI for
workers arises because they cannot borrow against future income to cover a temporary
decline in their income. This reasoning does not apply to ﬁrms which have much better
access to capital markets than unemployed workers. So there is no market failure that
needs to be ﬁxed and thus the argument for insurance is much weaker in the case of
employers (Gruber, 2011, p. 411).
A notable exception in UI ﬁnancing is the U.S. system where the employer's premium
rate depends on the amount of layoﬀs the ﬁrm has made in the past years. While the
details of the system vary between states, the general outcome is that ﬁrms are partially
responsible for the costs of UI payments to their employees, creating an incentive to
avoid layoﬀs. Empirical studies such as Anderson and Meyer (2000) and Woodbury et al.
(2004) show that a higher degree of experience rating reduces layoﬀs. However, since
the higher layoﬀ costs caused by the experience rating system make also hiring new
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workers less attractive, the net impact on unemployment is theoretically ambiguous. Most
of the research on the overall eﬀect of experience rating has been theoretical. Some
of these studies suggest that the experience rating of UI premiums is likely to reduce
unemployment (e.g. Albrecht and Vroman, 1999, and Cahuc and Malherbet, 2004). There
is one empirical study by Ratner (2013), which ﬁnds that the experience rating system in
the U.S. has a net positive but small eﬀect on employment.
In Finland, ﬁrms pay ﬂat-rate UI premiums to ﬁnance the costs of regular UI beneﬁts,
but large ﬁrms are subject to experience rating when it comes to the costs of extended UI
beneﬁts. That is, large employers pay a given share of the extended beneﬁts paid to their
former employees who were old enough at the time of layoﬀ. In the light of the ﬁndings
of Hakola and Uusitalo (2005) on the eﬀects of the experience rating of unemployment
pension costs, this probably lowers the layoﬀ rate of the oldest workers, which nonetheless
remains at a high level. We return to this issue in section 4.3.3.
UI Financing and Unions In Finland, wage increases are negotiated between em-
ployer organizations and labor unions. UI beneﬁts are in large part paid out by union-
aﬃliated unemployment funds but membership fees cover only a modest share of the be-
neﬁt payments to unemployed union members given that almost all of the funding (94.5%
in 2015) comes from general tax revenues and ﬂat-rate UI premiums paid by all ﬁrms
and all employees. Therefore, when a labor union negotiates a wage hike for its members
over the members of other unions, its employed members bear only a small share of the
costs of increased beneﬁt payments to its unemployed members which arise because of
higher beneﬁts (as the replacement rate is ﬁxed) and longer unemployment spells (due
to the disincentive eﬀect of higher beneﬁts and lower labor demand). The result may be
higher wage claims. This of course applies to all labor unions but as the unions diﬀer in
bargaining power the strongest unions may be able to exploit the cross-subsidization of
UI expenditures. See Sinko (2004) for an analysis of the employment eﬀects of various
cost-sharing schemes between the government and union-aﬃliated unemployment funds.
3.4 Optimal Design of UI
The literature on the optimal design of UI aims to characterize the beneﬁt scheme that
maximizes the worker's expected lifetime utility (social welfare) taking into account be-
havioral responses and the budget constraint. The traditional approach is to make a
bunch of theoretical assumptions and then compare welfare levels obtained by simulating
the theoretical model under various parameter values for beneﬁt generosity (e.g. the repla-
cement rate or maximum beneﬁt duration) or under diﬀerent beneﬁt structures (e.g. the
ﬂat vs. declining beneﬁt path over the unemployment spell). This structural approach
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is ﬂexible but the models are very complex and the results are sensitive to the underlying
assumptions of the theoretical model and chosen parameter values. The predictions of
these models are also diﬃcult to validate with empirical data.
Based on the work of Baily (1978), Chetty (2008) derives a relatively simple formula
to assess the optimal level of UI beneﬁts using a simple search model. This formula is
relatively robust to changes in the underlying theoretical model, and it depends only on a
few reduced-form elasticities which serve as suﬃcient statistics for welfare analysis. The
formula provides a means to make normative claims about the optimal level of beneﬁt
generosity based on the elasticities that are estimable from micro data. The limitation of
this approach is that it can only be used to evaluate the welfare eﬀects of small changes
in beneﬁt generosity under the current structure of the beneﬁt scheme. More recently,
Schmieder et al. (2012) propose a similar formula for the optimal length of the entitlement
period, whereas Kolsrud et al. (2015) generalize the suﬃcient statistics approach for the
case of the dynamic beneﬁt proﬁle.
While the traditional approach based on calibrated structural models is inconclusive
about the optimal structure of the UI scheme, evidence on the optimal beneﬁt generosity
based on the suﬃcient statistics approach is still very scarce, and the ﬁndings from this
literature are highly country-speciﬁc.21 Nevertheless we highlight some lessons from these
branches of the literature.
Moral Hazard versus Liquidity Eﬀects Chetty (2008) points out that UI beneﬁts
can aﬀect the job ﬁnding rate of liquidity constrained workers for two reasons. The ﬁrst
is that it indirectly subsidizes leisure while unemployed. This is the traditional moral
hazard eﬀect which arises to the extent that the beneﬁt recipients alter their behavior
because employment will increase their income less than it would in the absence of the
beneﬁts. Thus the eﬀect captures the distortion in the incentive to work caused by UI.
The liquidity eﬀect arises if unemployed workers with no savings have to reduce their
consumption because they are unable to borrow against their future wage income. The
drop in consumption induces unemployed workers to take up jobs they would not have
accepted had they been able to smooth their consumption through borrowing. This
eﬀect arises only because of the borrowing constraints. The UI beneﬁts enable liquidity
constrained workers to maintain their consumption at a reasonable level and thus allow
them to make job search choices that are closer to the choices they would choose with
perfect credit markets. This way the beneﬁts enhance eﬃciency.
The distinction between these two eﬀects is crucial from the welfare point of the view:
the liquidity eﬀect is a desirable eﬀect of UI which increases welfare, whereas the moral
21For an overview of this literature see Chetty and Finkelstein (2013).
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hazard eﬀect is an undesirable side eﬀect of UI which reduces welfare. It follows that a
larger eﬀect of UI beneﬁts on unemployment duration may not necessarily imply that less
generous beneﬁts are desirable. If the eﬀect is due to the liquidity (moral hazard) eﬀect,
an increase (decrease) in beneﬁt generosity would be welfare improving. Most of the
earlier analysis of UI have ignored the liquidity eﬀect and thus the labor supply eﬀects of
UI have been traditionally interpreted to reﬂect only moral hazard. Chetty (2008) argues
that a substantial share of the reduced-form eﬀect of UI on unemployment duration may
be due to the liquidity eﬀect, suggesting that the disincentive eﬀects of UI may have been
traditionally overestimated.
Chetty (2008), Card et al. (2007a) and Basten et al. (2014) provide empirical evidence
that the liquidity eﬀect is quantitatively important using data from the U.S., Austria and
Norway, respectively. Two sorts of evidence on the importance of the liquidity eﬀects have
been presented. One is the ﬁnding that those unemployed who are presumably liquidity
constrained (such constraints are diﬃcult to measure, so some proxies must be used in
practice) are more responsive to changes in UI beneﬁts than other unemployed. The
second is that lump-sump severance payments are found to lead to longer unemployment
spells among presumably liquidity constrained workers. Unlike the UI beneﬁts, severance
pay is not conditional on staying unemployed and thus it does not distort the incentive
to work. As such, receipt of severance pay should aﬀect unemployment duration only
through the liquidity eﬀect.
Uusitalo and Verho (2010) study how the 2003 removal of severance pay in Finland
aﬀected the job ﬁnding rate. They ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀect for severance pay, suggesting
that the liquidity eﬀect is not important in the Finnish labor market. This interpretation
should be treated with some caution, however. The group eligible for severance pay was
relatively small (1,420 individuals) consisting of workers over age 45 who had worked at
least ﬁve years for their last employer or eight years for their last two employers. Because
these individuals are more likely to have a spouse (because of their age) and some savings
or assets (because of their age and long job tenure) than the average UI recipient, they
are also less likely to be subject to binding liquidity constraints. It is quite possible that
the liquidity eﬀect could have played an important role in some other groups, such as
younger unemployed with sporadic employment history.
The Time Path of the Beneﬁts An important question is what is the optimal time
proﬁle for the beneﬁts, i.e. should a constant level of beneﬁts be paid indeﬁnitely, or
should the beneﬁt level vary over the course of the unemployment spell. In the presence
of perfect credit markets when unemployed workers could freely save and borrow, the
constant beneﬁt would be optimal as the policy makers cannot aﬀect the consumption
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pattern over the unemployment spell by altering the beneﬁt path (e.g. Tatsiramos and
van Ours, 2014). In the presence of the borrowing constraints, an increasing beneﬁt
proﬁle is desirable from the viewpoint of consumption smoothing because the long-term
unemployed are more likely to have spent the savings they possibly had at unemployment
entry. At the same time such a time proﬁle provides a strong incentive to stay unemployed
to collect increasing beneﬁts, enhancing the moral hazard eﬀect. Because of this trade-oﬀ,
theoretical predictions are quite sensitive with respect to assumptions about the structural
parameters of the model.
Provided that the literature on the optimal time proﬁle of the beneﬁt has been almost
entirely theoretical, it may not come as a surprise that the results are mixed: declining,
increasing, ﬂat and hump-shaped proﬁles have all been found to be optimal in diﬀerent
studies. Despite this ambiguity, the traditional and still quite popular view is that a
gradually decreasing beneﬁt schedule might be desirable (Cahuc and Zylberberg, 2004,
and Holmlund, 2015). A close practical cousin to this scheme is the two-tiered system
used in many countries, including Finland, in which the earnings-related UI beneﬁts are
paid over a limited period of time, after which a lower ﬂat-rate unemployment beneﬁt (i.e.
labor market subsidy in Finland) is available without a time limit. One potential problem
of the declining beneﬁt proﬁle compared to a constant or increasing level of beneﬁts is
that the relatively high beneﬁts for the short-term unemployed can encourage temporary
layoﬀs which last only for a short time.22 A waiting period before the beneﬁts are paid
and the experience rating of UI premiums can be used to mitigate this problem (e.g.
Fredriksson and Holmlund, 2006).
There is one recent empirical study by Kolsrud et al. (2015) where the authors apply
a dynamic version of the suﬃcient statistics approach to rich Swedish data that combine
register data on unemployment spells and wealth with survey data on consumption. They
ﬁnd that the consumption smoothing beneﬁt of UI increases while the moral hazard cost
declines with the elapsed duration of unemployment, suggesting that an increasing beneﬁt
proﬁle might be desirable.
Beneﬁt Generosity Over the Business Cycle As pointed out earlier, the UI system
functions as an automatic stabilizer, increasing private consumption during economic
downturns, without direct government intervention. In some countries (U.S., Canada and
Poland) the cyclical response of UI is further enhanced by extending beneﬁt entitlement
22As pointed out by Cahuc and Lehmann (2000), the declining proﬁle may also increase wage pressure
and hence unemployment when the labor unions and employers bargain over the wages. This is because
the higher beneﬁts for the short-term unemployed improve the fallback option of insiders  employed
union members  if they are eligible for UI beneﬁts during a strike when the negotiations fail. In Finland,
however, the workers are not eligible for UI beneﬁts during strikes and lockouts.
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periods during recessions.23 For example, in some U.S. states the maximum beneﬁt period
was extended from 26 to 99 weeks during the Great Recession that started in 2008. The
timing of these beneﬁt extensions leads to an additional boost through private spending to
the economy when the aggregate demand is low. This is one but not the only reason why
many economists believe that more generous beneﬁts should be provided during recessions
than booms (e.g. Andersen and Svarer, 2010, Andersen, 2014, and Marinescu, 2016).
In a recession a larger share of unemployed households may be liquidity constrained
because unemployment spells are longer and because it is more likely that both spouses
are out of work at the same time. This implies that the consumption smoothing beneﬁt
of UI is probably higher during recessions than booms, which is another argument for the
counter-cyclical UI scheme.
When there are many unemployed job seekers for each vacant job, an increase in the
search intensity of a given worker improves his or her changes of ﬁnding a new job but
at the cost of reducing the job-ﬁnding prospects of all other job seekers, i.e. having a
negative search externality. Under such conditions more generous beneﬁts reduce excess
competition over the same vacancies by discouraging job search of UI recipients (the
search externality eﬀect) and, therefore, possibly have only a moderate eﬀect on aggregate
unemployment. A counter argument is that providing more generous beneﬁts during a
recession may reduce job creation exactly at the time when new jobs are most needed
(the labor demand eﬀect), and thereby increase already high unemployment. Which of
these two eﬀects dominates is an empirical question.
Marinescu (2016) ﬁnds that the beneﬁt extensions in the U.S. during the Great Re-
cession reduced the search eﬀort of unemployed (as measured by the number of job ap-
plications sent) but did not decrease the number of job vacancies posted by ﬁrms. Her
ﬁndings thus imply that UI raises labor market tightness, deﬁned as the ratio of job va-
cancies to aggregate search eﬀort in the economy. Provided that labor market tightness is
ineﬃciently low (high) during recessions (booms), this result also supports the idea that
counter-cyclical UI beneﬁts are optimal. Landais et al. (2016a, 2016b) provide further
evidence for this conclusion.
23In the U.S., the entitlement period is automatically extended in states where the unemployment rate
is above 5% and at least 20% higher than in the previous two years (Stone and Chen, 2014). The length of
the extension is 13 weeks while the normal maximum beneﬁt duration is 26 weeks. Individual states can
also optionally choose to extend the maximum beneﬁt duration by up to 20 weeks if the unemployment
rate exceeds certain threshold values. Additionally, during the years 20082013 as an emergency response
to the Great Recession, the maximum beneﬁt duration was extended by 34 weeks on a federal level and
by 53 weeks in states with very high unemployment rates. All extensions combined, the maximum beneﬁt
duration at the time was 99 weeks in some states, which is very close to the maximum duration of 100
weeks that was in use in Finland until 2016.
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3.5 Main Lessons
We conclude this section by highlighting a few lessons from the above discussions:
• In the presence of borrowing constraints, some degree of UI increases societal welfare,
even though it will lead to a higher level of unemployment. The beneﬁt of UI is the
amount of consumption smoothing it provides by partially ﬁxing the credit market
failure. The cost of UI is the moral hazard it induces by distorting the incentive
to work (and possibly layoﬀ decisions by ﬁrms depending on how UI is ﬁnanced).
Unfortunately, there is no evidence on the eﬀect of UI beneﬁts on consumption
smoothing in Finland. Nor are we able to present such evidence. Our empirical
analysis in the next section sheds some light on the reduced-form eﬀects of UI
beneﬁts on unemployment spells but we are unable to diﬀerentiate between the
liquidity and moral hazard eﬀects.
• More generous beneﬁts in terms of either higher beneﬁt levels or longer entitlement
periods are likely to lead to longer spells of unemployment among UI recipients.
However, an improvement in beneﬁt generosity may also reduce unemployment du-
ration of non-recipients, mitigating the overall eﬀect on unemployment. Our empi-
rical analysis focuses on the former eﬀect, but one should keep the latter eﬀect in
mind.
• UI beneﬁts can subsidize both unproductive leisure time and productive job se-
arch, which have opposite policy implications. Longer unemployment spells caused
by more generous beneﬁts are not necessarily undesirable if they lead to better
employer-employee matches and when they reﬂect fewer transitions out of the labor
force. This highlights the need to consider also the eﬀect of UI on the quality of
subsequent jobs, as we do in the next section.
• Based on the theoretical literature it is diﬃcult to give policy recommendations
about the desired level, duration or time path of beneﬁts which would be optimal
from the welfare viewpoint. But it is obvious that a more generous UI scheme
is viable when the moral hazard problem is alleviated also by other means than
monetary incentives, such as monitoring of job search behavior and mandatory
participation in the labor market programs. There is also a rather strong case for
a business cycle-dependent UI scheme that provides more generous beneﬁts during
recessions than booms.
• Some degree of experience rating of UI premiums might be useful in reducing the
excess use of temporary layoﬀs within industries as well as in increasing resource
allocation across industries.
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4 Evidence on Behavioral Eﬀects
4.1 Employment Condition and Unemployment Inﬂow
The eligibility conditions have received much less attention in the economic literature
than other aspects of UI schemes. While the eligibility conditions have been stressed
by many authors (e.g. Atkinson and Micklewright, 1991, and Tatsiramos and van Ours,
2014) and incorporated into some theoretical models of job search and UI (e.g. Mortensen,
1977, Hopenhayn and Nicolini, 2009, and Andersen et al., 2015), empirical research on
their eﬀects is scarce. As pointed out in the theory section, the eligibility conditions in
terms of past employment can aﬀect the unemployment inﬂow rate by inducing layoﬀs or
encouraging quits. The empirical analysis has focused on estimating this eﬀect.
Christoﬁdes and McKenna (1996) ﬁnd that once employees fulﬁll the employment
condition, the exit rate from work to compensated unemployment increases markedly.
According to Green and Sargent (1998), the spike in the exit rate is associated only with
seasonal jobs. Green and Riddell (1997) and Baker and Rea (1998) ﬁnd that while the
quit hazard remains constant the layoﬀ hazard increases at the time when the employee
satisﬁes the eligibility condition. All these empirical studies are rather old and consider a
single country, Canada. More recently, Jurajda (2002) using U.S. data and Rebollo-Sanz
(2012) using Spanish data also ﬁnd that eligibility for UI signiﬁcantly raises the probability
of a layoﬀ but the probability of a quit is not aﬀected. Hägglund (2009) provides evidence
that in Sweden job exits cluster at the time of UI qualiﬁcation and that an increase in the
employment condition led to longer employment durations. These studies suggest that
layoﬀ decisions are at least to some extent aﬀected by the employee's UI eligibility.
To provide evidence for Finland we analyze the 2003 reform which changed the eli-
gibility requirement from 43 to 34 contribution weeks. We use data on compensated
unemployment spells that started between 2001 and 2004 after a job loss (see the appen-
dix for details). The reform was proposed by the government on September 13, 2002, and
the law came into eﬀect on January 1, 2003. We drop spells started between these days as
they may have been subject to anticipatory behavior. Furthermore, we require that the
duration of the last job was no less than four weeks and that the job ended within four
weeks prior to the beneﬁt claim (note this eliminates voluntary quits). We further limit
our analysis to individuals between the ages of 25 and 54 who have been a member of an
unemployment fund at least for the past two years, who have received UI beneﬁts after
1996 and who have been in the labor force for at least 90% of the time during the past
two years without being self-employed or hired with a wage subsidy. The age restriction
eliminates older workers entitled to extended beneﬁts and younger ones who were aﬀected
by another change. The UI history condition guarantees that the workers with 3442 con-
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tribution weeks were aﬀected by the law. Other restrictions are imposed to improve the
accuracy of our measure of the number of the contribution weeks. This variable is diﬃcult
to measure because we do not observe working hours and because the review period may
be extended for various reasons, and due to the complexity of the rules regarding how
self-employment and subsidized jobs are treated. Despite these sample restrictions, the
estimated number of contribution weeks remains subject to some measurement error (we
return to this issue later on).
All workers included in the analysis are entitled either to UI beneﬁts or labor market
subsidy at the beginning of the spell. The ﬁnal sample contains 115,220 unemployment
spells, of which as many as 96% start with receipt of UI beneﬁts. Unlike in the previous
studies listed above, we do not consider the exit rate from work to unemployment or the
duration of employment spells but instead compare the distributions of the contribution
weeks between those entering unemployment before and after the reform. If employed
workers time their unemployment entry according to the employment condition rules,
we should see a mass point on the right-hand side of the threshold value of 43 weeks
in the pre-reform distribution, and this mass point should have moved towards the new
threshold value of 34 weeks after the reform. No such evidence is seen in ﬁgure 11. The
pre- and post-reform distributions are very similar, suggesting that employed workers or
their employers did not change their behavior in response to the law change.
In addition to a spike at 43 contribution weeks, there is bunching of observations on the
wrong side of the old threshold value. Given that the mass of the observations between
41 and 43 weeks did not vanish in the post-reform period, it is likely to be unrelated to the
employment condition. Nor can it be explained by measurement error because the vast
majority of individuals with 41 or 42 contribution weeks in the pre-reform period did not
satisfy the employment condition according to the UI records (this is illustrated in ﬁgure
20 below) which should be more reliable than our measure of the contribution weeks. It
turns out that the mass point can be attributed to individuals who entered unemployment
in June. The mass point disappears altogether when we drop the individuals who became
unemployed in June, as shown in ﬁgure 12. Most of the unemployment entrants in June
with 41 or 42 weeks are female health care or social workers from the public sector. These
workers also quite often return to their previous employer, even though temporarily laid
oﬀ workers with a valid employment contract have been excluded from the sample.
We have also compared the contribution week distributions separately for workers
who were laid oﬀ, who quit and those whose ﬁxed-term contract ended. As a further
robustness check, we have examined the distributions of the duration of the previous
job for all unemployed workers as well as for subgroups who became unemployed for
diﬀerent reasons. None of these analyses indicates that the timing of the unemployment
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Figure 11: Distribution of contribution weeks by period of unemployment entry. Pre-
reform spells started between January 1, 2001 and September 12, 2002, and post-reform
spells between January 1, 2003 and December 31, 2004.
entry from employment would have changed in response to the 2003 reform. As such it
seems evident that workers do not leave employment for unemployment at a higher rate
once their contribution weeks exceed the threshold value of the employment condition.
Nor do the employers target dismissals at those employees who would be entitled to the
maximum duration of UI beneﬁts.24 Our ﬁndings are thus at odds with the evidence for
other countries discussed above.
Even though the unemployment inﬂow did not respond to the 2003 change in the
employment condition, the reform had an eﬀect on the average duration of unemployment
spells. After the reform a higher fraction of unemployment entrants was awarded a new
period of 500 UI days (100 weeks). Provided that potential beneﬁt duration has a positive
eﬀect on expected unemployment duration, unemployment spells should have become
longer on average within a subgroup of workers who renewed their beneﬁt period due to
the new rules. In section 4.3, we estimate that one additional week of UI beneﬁts increases
expected unemployment duration by some 0.15 weeks. If we ignore measurement error in
the contribution weeks, a simple diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimate based on a comparison
24This conclusion does not apply to older groups who can qualify for extended UI beneﬁts until retire-
ment, which are excluded from the analysis. Older groups are analyzed in section 4.3.3.
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Figure 12: Distribution of contribution weeks by period of unemployment entry without
spells starting in June. Pre-reform spells started between January 1, 2001 and September
12, 2002, and post-reform spells between January 1, 2003 and December 31, 2004.
of workers with 3442 contribution weeks (treatment group) to those with 4360 weeks
(control group) suggests that the reform prolonged unemployment spells by 3.7 weeks or
22% among those aﬀected. The aﬀected group is relatively small, accounting only for
13% of the unemployment inﬂow in our sample. As a consequence, the average duration
in the whole sample increased only by 0.5 week or 2%.
Kauhanen et al. (2008) conduct a somewhat similar exercise. They study a reform
in 1997 where the employment condition was increased from 26 to 43 weeks in Finland.
They do not consider the eﬀect on the unemployment inﬂow but focus on the change
in the exit rate from unemployment to employment. They compare the job ﬁnding rate
before and after the reform among unemployed workers who had worked enough to fulﬁll
the earlier condition but not enough for the new one (i.e. those who lost their eligibility
for a new UI period), using workers whose eligibility status did not change due to the
reform as a control group. They ﬁnd that the reform increased the exit rate of young and
high-skilled workers without aﬀecting the exit rate of other workers within the treatment
group.
Note that the eligibility rules may also aﬀect how the job ﬁnding rate depends on the
current eligibility status (eligible or not, the number of remaining UI days if eligible). The
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incentive to accept a job oﬀer depends on how that job will aﬀect beneﬁt eligibility in case
of future unemployment. For an unemployed person who is not currently entitled to UI
beneﬁts or who is close to beneﬁt exhaustion, a more lenient employment condition may
encourage re-employment as it increases the value of each job oﬀer. On the other hand,
by making re-qualifying for beneﬁts in the future easier, it may discourage those workers
who are still entitled to many days of beneﬁts. To our knowledge, there is no empirical
evidence on the eﬀect of the eligibility rules on unemployment exits, even though such an
eﬀect is predicted by job search theory.
4.2 The Eﬀects of Beneﬁt Level
4.2.1 Full-Time Beneﬁts
Consistent with the theoretical framework presented in section 3.2, numerous empirical
analyses of the UI beneﬁt level in various countries indicate that a higher UI beneﬁt level
prolongs unemployment duration (see Tatsiramos and van Ours, 2014, for a survey). The
elasticity of the unemployment duration with respect to the beneﬁt level is between 0.4
and 1 in most cases, i.e. a 1% increase in the UI beneﬁt level would lead to a 0.4%
to 1% increase in the unemployment duration. Higher elasticities have been found for
Sweden (Carling et al., 2001, estimate an elasticity of nonemployment duration of 1.6)
and in recent work on Austrian data (Card et al., 2015, ﬁnd elasticity estimates of 1 to 2
depending on which part of the wage distribution they examine).
Using Finnish data Uusitalo and Verho (2010) analyze the 2003 reform described in
section 2.3 which removed the severance pay and increased the beneﬁt level of unemployed
workers with long work histories for the ﬁrst 150 days of beneﬁt receipt (30 weeks). They
ﬁnd that the elasticity of nonemployment duration with respect to the beneﬁt level is
0.8 for this group of job seekers. Uusitalo and Verho (2010) note that diﬀerent groups
of unemployed workers were aﬀected in diﬀerent ways by the reform, with some groups
eligible for both severance pay before the reform and increased beneﬁts afterward, while
others were only entitled to one of these. The setup thus enables an analysis of liquidity
and moral hazard eﬀects of UI beneﬁts as severance pay should inﬂuence unemployment
duration only through the liquidity eﬀect, whereas the increased daily beneﬁts can distort
the incentives to search for a job. For the majority of unemployed the reform replaced
severance pay by higher daily beneﬁts, with the expected value of the beneﬁt increase
roughly equal to the severance pay. The elasticity estimate above was for this group
of workers and should, therefore, be interpreted as evidence on the distortions of search
incentives created by UI beneﬁts. The authors ﬁnd that the removal of severance pay
alone had little eﬀect on re-employment rates, whereas the increase in the UI beneﬁt
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level substantially decreased re-employment rates for those who had not previously been
eligible for severance pay. These results would imply that the distortionary eﬀects are
more important than liquidity eﬀects. However, the authors point out that the number
of observations in these separate groups is quite low and the results should, therefore, be
treated with caution.
Uusitalo and Moisala (2003) also use Finnish data to examine the eﬀect of a reform
in 1989 that removed a decrease in the beneﬁt level after 200 beneﬁt days and resulted
in a constant beneﬁt schedule for 500 days of UI beneﬁts. They ﬁnd no eﬀect of the
change in the beneﬁt schedule on unemployment duration, but acknowledge that there
are confounding factors in the analysis which can inﬂuence the results. More recently,
Kyyrä and Pesola (2016) study the eﬀects of the UI beneﬁt level in Finland by exploiting
the kink in the beneﬁt schedule shown in ﬁgure 2. The results indicate that higher UI
beneﬁts prolong nonemployment duration with an elasticity of 1.5 to 2. As in Card et al.
(2015) who use a similar research design, these estimates are higher than in most other
studies on the eﬀects of the UI beneﬁt level. It should be noted that diﬀerences between
the results in Uusitalo and Verho (2010) and Kyyrä and Pesola (2016) can arise e.g.
from the fact that the former study exploits a reform that aﬀected only those with long
work histories and the simultaneous removal of severance pay implies that the eﬀect is
exclusive of potential liquidity eﬀects. The results of the latter study will be discussed in
more detail below.
As discussed in section 3.2, the eﬀect of the UI beneﬁt level can vary during the
unemployment spell with the eﬀect on the exit rate likely to be stronger early in the
unemployment spell. Empirical studies have found that this is indeed the case, e.g. La-
live et al. (2006) examine a policy change in Austria and ﬁnd that an increase in the
replacement rate has most of its eﬀect on the exit rate at the beginning of the unemploy-
ment spell. In the Finnish case Uusitalo and Verho (2010) also examine the eﬀect of the
increase in UI beneﬁts on the job ﬁnding hazard along the unemployment duration and
ﬁnd that the negative eﬀect is largest during the ﬁrst months after entry into unemploy-
ment. An earlier Finnish study by Kettunen (1993) ﬁnds that unemployment beneﬁts are
negatively associated with the probability of becoming employed at the beginning of the
unemployment spell but that this association disappears after three months. This study
is limited by the use of cross-section data.
In the search model in section 3.2, UI beneﬁts aﬀect unemployment duration through
both the search eﬀort and reservation wage. These two may have diﬀerent implications
in the cost-beneﬁt analysis of beneﬁt generosity. If higher beneﬁts do not reduce search
intensity much but enable unemployed to search longer for a job that matches their skills,
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the beneﬁt recipients should ﬁnd better jobs than they would with lower beneﬁts.25 In
that case longer unemployment spells caused by higher beneﬁts are less of a problem than
when the longer spells are due to reduced search eﬀort with no improvement in employee-
employer matches. For this reason it is important to also consider the eﬀects of the beneﬁt
level on subsequent labor market outcomes. Empirical evidence on these eﬀects is quite
scarce and the results are mixed.
Addison and Blackburn (2000) ﬁnd that higher UI beneﬁts have hardly any eﬀect on
subsequent wages in the U.S. labor market, but Centeno (2004) shows that higher beneﬁts
increase the duration of the subsequent employment spell. Ek (2013) ﬁnds evidence that
higher UI beneﬁts decrease annual earnings and monthly wages in Sweden, while the
probability of re-employment and employment durations do not appear to be aﬀected. The
negative eﬀect of UI beneﬁts on match quality may imply that human capital depreciates
during unemployment or that employers discriminate against long-term unemployed.26
Rebollo-Sanz and Rodriguez-Planas (2016) study a decrease in the replacement rate in
Spain and ﬁnd no eﬀect on post-unemployment wages and no decrease in other measures
of job-match quality.
In Kyyrä and Pesola (2016) we study the eﬀect of the UI beneﬁt level on various
labor market outcomes using data covering the entire population of unemployed workers
in Finland for years 2003 to 2009. In the analysis we exploit the kink in the relationship
between the previous wage and UI beneﬁts in Finland. This piecewise linear beneﬁt
rule allows us to use a regression kink design to identify the causal eﬀects of the beneﬁt
level on various outcomes (see Card et al., 2015, and references therein). We consider
the eﬀect of UI beneﬁts on the duration of beneﬁt receipt, re-employment probability,
the time to the next job and prevalence of part-time unemployment (the time spent in
marginal employment while collecting partial UI beneﬁts). We also analyze various post-
unemployment outcomes, such as the duration and wage of the next job, and working
days and earnings within a two-year period.
As in other RKD studies, the results in Kyyrä and Pesola (2016) are quite sensi-
tive to the choices of bandwidth and polynomial order. Since no single optimal proce-
dure to make such choices exists, we consider a range of nonparametric estimates based
on local linear and quadratic speciﬁcations using various bandwidth selectors, as well
as covariate-adjusted estimates obtained from larger samples. Tables 2 and 3 present
covariate-adjusted elasticity estimates for a range of bandwidths from Kyyrä and Pesola
(2016). We consider polynomial models of orders 1 to 3 and report elasticity estimates
25Using time use survey data Krueger and Mueller (2010) ﬁnd that UI recipients search less actively
in U.S. states with more generous beneﬁts.
26Kroft et al. (2013) present experimental evidence that the employers do discriminate against job
applicants who have been longer unemployed when selecting applicants who are invited to a job interview.
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Table 2: Elasticity estimates for unemployment outcomes at varying bandwidths
Fraction of partial Re-employment
UI duration Time to next job unemployment probability
BW N P Elasticity (SE) P Elasticity (SE) P Elasticity (SE) P Elasticity (SE)
10 31,359 2 8.27** (3.92) 1 1.31 (1.12) 1 -3.12 (4.03) 1 -0.12 (0.43)
15 48,689 2 2.66 (2.14) 2 1.79 (2.44) 1 -5.16** (2.28) 1 -0.54** (0.24)
20 67,621 2 1.67 (1.42) 1 0.40 (0.41) 1 -4.23** (1.52) 1 -0.16 (0.16)
25 88,756 3 4.97* (2.52) 1 0.46 (0.30) 1 -3.03** (1.10) 1 -0.15 (0.11)
30 111,352 2 0.90 (0.79) 1 0.08 (0.24) 1 -2.64*** (0.86) 1 -0.10 (0.09)
35 134,169 2 0.63 (0.65) 3 2.17 (1.77) 2 -7.28** (2.67) 1 -0.06 (0.07)
40 155,990 3 1.01 (1.30) 3 1.65 (1.47) 2 -6.22** (2.23) 2 -0.50** (0.23)
45 174,392 3 1.01 (1.11) 3 1.35 (1.26) 2 -5.56*** (1.92) 2 -0.51** (0.20)
50 188,836 2 0.61 (0.41) 3 1.96* (1.10) 2 -4.47** (1.68) 2 -0.52*** (0.18)
55 199,011 2 0.40 (0.37) 2 1.73*** (0.41) 2 -4.61*** (1.50) 2 -0.64*** (0.16)
Notes: BW = bandwidth. N = Number of observations. P = Order of the polynomial function chosen
on the basis of the Akaike information criterion. Models include controls for the year and month of
unemployment entry, gender, the number of children, interactions between the number of children and
gender, education, occupation, age, Helsinki metropolitan region and a dummy for dismissed workers.
The standard errors in parenthesis. Signiﬁcance levels: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%.
for the speciﬁcation with the lowest value of the Akaike information criterion.27 The spe-
ciﬁcation includes controls for the year and month of unemployment entry, gender, the
number of children, interactions between the number of children and gender, education,
occupation, age, Helsinki metropolitan region and a dummy for dismissed workers.
Our ﬁndings in table 2 indicate that higher UI beneﬁts prolong nonemployment du-
ration (i.e. time to the next job) with an elasticity around 1.5 to 2. These estimates are,
however, quite sensitive to the speciﬁcation and precision is achieved at wider bandwidths.
The elasticity estimates would imply a 3 to 4 day increase in the nonemployment dura-
tion if unemployment beneﬁts increased by 1%. These elasticity estimates are in line with
those of Carling et al. (2001) for Sweden and the estimates in Card et al. (2015) for the
upper part of the Austrian wage distribution. In Finland the kink in the beneﬁt schedule
is quite high in the distribution of the pre-unemployment wages, at 2300 Euros a month
(in 2009 Euros) during our observation period, which is above the 80th percentile in our
estimation sample. We also examine the eﬀect of the UI beneﬁt level on the duration of
UI beneﬁt receipt, but the results are not conclusive.
We ﬁnd that higher UI beneﬁts lead to a decrease in the share of days spent on partial
unemployment beneﬁts, i.e. in subsidized part-time or temporary jobs. The elasticity of
the share of part-time unemployment days in the UI spell with respect to the beneﬁt level
varies somewhat depending on the speciﬁcation but is consistently negative and quite
large. The estimates in table 2 indicate that a 1% increase in the UI beneﬁt level would
27For most outcomes the estimates from the linear models are sensitive with respect to the bandwidth,
whereas the estimates from quadratic and cubic models remain quite stable after a certain value of the
bandwidth (typically around 30 Euros).
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Table 3: Elasticity estimates for post-unemployment outcomes at varying bandwidths
Working days within Earnings within
Duration of next job Wage of next job the next 2 years the next 2 years
BW N P Elasticity (SE) P Elasticity (SE) P Elasticity (SE) P Elasticity (SE)
10 31,359 1 1.37 (1.49) 1 -0.53 (0.49) 1 -0.48 (0.60) 1 -1.16 (0.81)
15 48,689 1 1.34 (0.82) 1 -0.64** (0.27) 2 -1.36 (1.30) 2 -1.19 (1.76)
20 67,621 1 1.51** (0.55) 2 -1.57** (0.70) 3 -0.81 (2.12) 2 -2.63** (1.24)
25 88,756 1 1.09** (0.40) 1 -0.22 (0.14) 1 -0.19 (0.16) 1 -0.73*** (0.26)
30 111,352 1 0.93*** (0.31) 2 -0.77* (0.40) 1 -0.03 (0.13) 2 -1.43** (0.70)
35 134,169 1 1.14*** (0.25) 3 -1.27 (0.79) 3 -1.85* (0.95) 2 -1.53** (0.55)
40 155,990 1 1.07*** (0.22) 2 -0.95*** (0.28) 3 -1.19 (0.79) 3 -2.47** (1.18)
45 174,392 3 3.12* (1.66) 2 -0.94*** (0.24) 3 -1.12 (0.67) 2 -1.01** (0.43)
50 188,836 3 1.71 (1.46) 2 -0.86*** (0.21) 2 -0.60** (0.25) 2 -0.96** (0.38)
55 199,011 2 0.29 (0.54) 3 -1.64*** (0.45) 2 -0.75*** (0.22) 3 -1.81** (0.80)
Notes: BW = bandwidth. N = Number of observations. P = Order of the polynomial function chosen
on the basis of the Akaike information criterion. Models include controls for the year and month of
unemployment entry, gender, the number of children, interactions between the number of children and
gender, education, occupation, age, Helsinki metropolitan region and a dummy for dismissed workers.
The standard errors in parenthesis. Signiﬁcance levels: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%.
decrease the share of part-time unemployment days in the UI spell by approximately 5%,
i.e. from an average of 4% to 3.8%. It should be noted that this is a combination of fewer
unemployed workers taking up subsidized part-time or temporary jobs and those on partial
beneﬁts receiving partial beneﬁts for a smaller share of their total time on UI beneﬁts.
On average 10% of UI spells in the estimation sample include time on partial beneﬁts,
and conditional on receipt of partial beneﬁts, the share of part-time unemployment days
is approximately 40%. According to the results the probability that the UI spell ends in
employment also decreases with a higher beneﬁt level, with an elasticity around −0.5, but
the estimates are statistically signiﬁcant only at large bandwidths.
As seen in table 3, earnings both immediately after the unemployment spell and in
subsequent years are negatively aﬀected by higher UI beneﬁts. These results are also ro-
bust across the other speciﬁcations reported in Kyyrä and Pesola (2016). The elasticity of
the wage in the ﬁrst job after unemployment is around −0.5 to −1.5, which could indicate
employer discrimination or human capital depreciation due to prolonged unemployment.
Earnings in the two years following the beginning of the unemployment spell also decrease
with higher UI beneﬁts with an elasticity of −1 to −2. This earnings eﬀect is inﬂuenced
by decreasing working days as we ﬁnd that the elasticity of the number of working days
in the following two years with respect to the UI beneﬁt level is −0.5 to −1.8. However,
these estimates are not very robust to changes in the speciﬁcation and precision requires
large bandwidths. The ﬁnding that higher UI beneﬁts decrease subsequent working days
is obviously at least in part driven by potentially longer nonemployment spells and is
consistent with our observation that higher beneﬁts lead to less part-time and temporary
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employment. As a further measure of match quality we also analyze the duration of the
ﬁrst job after unemployment. The estimated elasticity of the job duration with respect
to the beneﬁt level is in general positive, which is somewhat surprising considering our
results on post-unemployment earnings. However, this result is not found in the other
speciﬁcations reported in Kyyrä and Pesola (2016).
4.2.2 Partial Beneﬁts and Earnings Disregard
Since 2014 the unemployed have been able to earn up to 300 Euros a month with no
reduction in their UI beneﬁts. With higher monthly earnings the unemployed may still
qualify for partial beneﬁts. The aim of the partial beneﬁts and earnings disregard is to
encourage job seekers to also consider part-time jobs or full-time jobs with very short
duration when no regular full-time jobs are available. If this kind of marginal employ-
ment helps the unemployed to accumulate new skills, provides contacts with employers or
reduces the stigma of being unemployed, working on partial beneﬁts can provide a step-
ping stone out of beneﬁts to more stable full-time employment. However, a large body
of empirical evidence on how unsubsidized temporary and part-time jobs aﬀect future
labor market prospects is inconclusive, some studies ﬁnding positive eﬀects while others
arguing that such jobs are mainly dead-ends. Moreover, by subsidizing part-time jobs, the
partial beneﬁts and earnings disregard can also encourage unemployed workers to search
for part-time work at the expense of full-time work. In that case, the mere existence of
these instruments can lower the exit rate to self-supporting employment from the ﬁrst day
of unemployment among all job seekers, including those who will not eventually receive
partial beneﬁts during their unemployment spell. This is an ex ante eﬀect of having a
UI system with partial beneﬁts and earnings disregard compared to the counterfactual
system without such features. It is also diﬃcult to distinguish involuntary part-time wor-
kers from those who work part-time by choice (Ek, 2015). The latter group should not
be eligible for UI beneﬁts but have an obvious incentive to claim the beneﬁts when these
can be received on top of part-time earnings.
The 300-Euro earnings disregard was introduced so recently in Finland that its eﬀects
have not been studied yet. Similar earnings disregards for the unemployed exist at least
in the U.S., Canada, U.K., Germany and Austria. In the U.S. labor market, unemployed
workers can earn up to a given amount over a week with no reduction in their UI beneﬁts,
after which the beneﬁts are reduced on a dollar-for-dollar basis. This diﬀers from the
Finnish scheme where earnings that exceed the threshold reduce the UI beneﬁts only by
50%, not by 100%. In both countries the reduced beneﬁts are not necessarily lost as
they can be collected later provided the worker remains unemployed for the maximum
duration of full-time beneﬁts (that is, the same amount of the beneﬁts can be collected
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over a longer period of time).
Munts (1970), Holen and Horowitz (1974) and Le Barbanchon (2016a) provide evi-
dence that workers in the U.S. labor market adjust their part-time working to gain from
combined earnings and beneﬁts. McCall (1996) shows that a higher disregard encourages
full-time unemployed workers to take up part-time jobs during the ﬁrst three months of
the unemployment spell. These U.S. studies suggest that partial beneﬁts encourage part-
time working and induce many workers to choose their working hours in such a way that
their earnings do not exceed the disregard. What these papers do not tell us is whether
or not taking up a part-time job while still collecting UI beneﬁts improves the chances
of ﬁnding a full-time job in the future. A handful of European studies have addressed
this issue quite recently. All these studies follow a timing-of-event approach to deal with
the self-selection of unemployed workers into partial beneﬁts, and estimate multivariate
hazard models to quantify the eﬀect of receipt of partial beneﬁts on the exit rate out of
beneﬁts.
The ﬁrst study by Kyyrä (2010) analyzes the Finnish scheme prior to the earnings
disregard using data on UI recipients who became unemployed in 1999 or 2000. At that
time the partial beneﬁts were payable to the unemployed who took up a part-time job or
a temporary full-time job of no longer than one month (currently two weeks). The results
imply that working full time and receiving partial beneﬁts for a short period shortens the
expected time until leaving beneﬁts for self-supporting employment for both women and
men. The eﬀect of part-time working on partial beneﬁts appears to be less clear: such
a period has no eﬀect for women but it may help men to ﬁnd a regular full-time job,
albeit the latter result is sensitive with respect to the model speciﬁcation. The sample
used in the analysis was relatively small, containing less than 2000 recipients of partial
beneﬁts, which may explain the inconclusive results for the part-time unemployed. For
the same reason also attempts to detect heterogeneity in the eﬀect of the receipt of partial
beneﬁts across worker group and over the course of the unemployment spell led to the
point estimates that are too imprecise to be informative.
Kyyrä et al. (2013) use a much larger data set to study the eﬀects of partial beneﬁts
in Denmark, where such beneﬁts can be received when working hours over a week are
below a given threshold level. Unlike the Finnish study, this study ﬁnds evidence of a
signiﬁcant lock-in eﬀect: being on partial beneﬁts reduces the unemployment exit rate.
However, after returning to full-time unemployment from partial beneﬁts the exit rate is
larger compared to the counterfactual case of having been full-time unemployed for the
whole time. As such, there is a trade-oﬀ between a negative lock-in eﬀect and a positive
stepping-stone eﬀect afterward. Kyyrä et al. (2013) show that the net eﬀect of these
two opposite eﬀects implies longer unemployment spells for some groups, such as married
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women, white-collar workers and long-term unemployed, but shorter spells for others,
such as young individuals and immigrants. Furthermore, longer spells of partial beneﬁts
tend to lead to longer unemployment spells due to the cumulative lock-in eﬀect, even
though the stepping-stone eﬀect also increases with the time spent in partial beneﬁts. It
follows that for immigrants and young unemployed relatively short periods of part-time
unemployment are helpful in reducing their overall unemployment duration.
Fremigacci and Terracol (2013) ﬁnd that partial beneﬁts are associated with lock-in
eﬀects also in France. On the contrary, Cockx et al. (2013) ﬁnd no lock-in eﬀects for
long-term unemployed young women in Belgium while Godøy and Røed (2016) ﬁnd no
such eﬀects in Norway. All the three studies ﬁnd that the exit rate to full-time employ-
ment increases after a period of partial beneﬁts. As a result, receipt of partial beneﬁts
unambiguously reduces the expected time until a full-time job in Belgium and Norway,
and does so in most cases also in France.
As in the U.S., in Germany unemployed workers can earn up to a given limit without
beneﬁt reductions, after which the UI beneﬁts are reduced on a euro-for-euro basis. In
addition, workers who hold a job that pays less than a certain threshold amount (known
as mini-jobs) are exempt from social security contributions. This provides an additional
incentive for the unemployed to combine UI beneﬁts and earnings from mini-jobs. Ca-
liendo et al. (2016) ﬁnd heterogeneity in the eﬀect of taking up a mini-job on the exit rate
from unemployment beneﬁts to self-supporting employment. The mini-jobs appear to be
helpful for the long-term unemployed and for those who live in regions with a high unem-
ployment rate, whereas job seekers who take up a mini-job during the ﬁrst six months of
unemployment tend to collect unemployment beneﬁts for a longer time.
In summary, these studies give a rather positive picture for the role of partial beneﬁts.
A common ﬁnding is that working on partial beneﬁts reduces the expected time until
self-supporting employment in many cases. In addition to shorter beneﬁt spells, less UI
beneﬁts are paid out during these spells as workers receive lower beneﬁts when part-
time unemployed than when full-time unemployed, which further reduces the beneﬁt
expenditures. The ﬁndings of lock-in eﬀects and impact heterogeneity however suggest
that part-time unemployment can also prolong unemployment spells in some cases. This
may be a relevant concern also in Finland, especially after the introduction of the earnings
disregard in 2014.
One should note that the studies discussed above consider only the eﬀects of actual
receipt of partial beneﬁts so that some adverse eﬀects that are diﬃcult to quantify may
have been ignored. Namely, these studies are not informative about the possible ex ante
eﬀect of having a UI system with partial beneﬁts on the re-employment rate prior to
receipt of the partial beneﬁts, nor the possible eﬀect on the unemployment inﬂow if some
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workers who are only interested in ﬁnding a part-time job (and hence should not be eligible
for UI beneﬁts) claim UI beneﬁts in order to gain from the partial beneﬁts.
For these reasons the partial beneﬁts should not be too generous. To minimize the
risk of moral hazard behavior, these beneﬁts should be paid only for a limited time period
and/or exhibit a declining time proﬁle, and search eﬀorts of part-time unemployed workers
may require some monitoring.
4.3 The Eﬀects of Beneﬁt Duration
Numerous studies analyze how the length of the beneﬁt period aﬀects unemployment
duration and post-unemployment outcomes (see a survey by Tatsiramos and van Ours,
2014). One common ﬁnding in this literature has been a notable spike in the number of
people leaving unemployment just when the beneﬁts are about to expire (Moﬃtt, 1985,
Katz and Meyer, 1990, Katz and Meyer, 1990, and Card et al., 2007b). The size of the
spike varies across studies, reﬂecting institutional diﬀerences (e.g. the maximum beneﬁt
duration and availability of other beneﬁts after UI beneﬁts have expired) and diﬀerences in
the used data (survey or register-based data) and how the unemployment spell is deﬁned
(the duration of beneﬁt receipt, the duration of registered unemployment or the time until
next job).
The spike in the exit rate from UI beneﬁts or registered unemployment around beneﬁt
exhaustion is typically more pronounced than the spike in the job ﬁnding rate (Card et al.,
2007b). The latter spike can be viewed as evidence of the distortionary eﬀects of UI, since
it suggests that some unemployed wait until their beneﬁts exhaust before they return to
work. Direct evidence on this type of behavior is provided by Krueger and Mueller (2010)
who analyze time use survey data from the U.S. and ﬁnd that the time spent in job search
increases prior to beneﬁt exhaustion among UI recipients and declines after beneﬁts are
exhausted.
Another robust ﬁnding is that longer beneﬁt periods lead to longer spells of unem-
ployment. A consensus estimate of Tatsiramos and van Ours (2014) is that a change
in the maximum beneﬁt duration leads to average unemployment duration changing by
approximately 20% of that amount. The estimates of course vary around this value across
countries. One extra week of entitlement to UI beneﬁts is estimated to increase the ex-
pected unemployment duration by 0.08 weeks in the U.S. (Card and Levine, 2000), 0.04
to 0.42 weeks in Austria (Lalive et al., 2006, Card et al., 2007a, and Lalive, 2008), 0.1 to
0.13 weeks in Germany (Schmieder et al., 2012) and 0.18 to 0.58 weeks in Slovenia (van
Ours and Vodopivec, 2006). Some of these studies also report higher eﬀects for women
than men.
Evidence on the eﬀect of potential beneﬁt duration on the post-unemployment job
52
quality is mixed, with some studies ﬁnding a positive eﬀect on subsequent jobs in terms
of either higher wages or job stability (e.g. Tatsiramos, 2009, Centeno and Novo, 2009,
Gaure et al., 2008, and Nekoei and Weber, 2015). Other studies ﬁnd negative or no eﬀects
of longer beneﬁt durations on match quality (e.g. Degen and Lalive, 2013, Lalive, 2007,
Caliendo et al., 2013, Card et al., 2007a, van Ours and Vodopivec, 2006, Le Barbanchon,
2016b, and Schmieder et al., 2016).
Many of the studies above exploit a policy change that extended or reduced the beneﬁt
period for some group of the unemployed but did not aﬀect other groups. Other studies
exploit discontinuities in the rule that determines the length of the beneﬁt period as a
function of age and/or work history. Both of these approaches can be applied to study
the eﬀect of extended beneﬁts (i.e. beneﬁt entitlement until retirement) for older workers
in Finland, but the analysis of the eﬀects of the potential duration of regular beneﬁts
for younger groups is trickier. Next we discuss the existing evidence and present some
new results on the eﬀects of beneﬁt exhaustion and potential beneﬁt duration for younger
groups and the eﬀects of extended beneﬁts for older groups in Finland.
4.3.1 The Spike at Beneﬁt Exhaustion
To provide some evidence on the eﬀects of beneﬁt exhaustion for Finland we rely on the
same data we used in assessing the eﬀects of the employment condition in section 4.1.
This time we exclude the spells that started with receipt of labor market subsidy but
we do not drop spells starting on September 13 and later in 2002. The resulting sample
covers 25 to 54 year old UI beneﬁt recipients with a strong labor market attachment who
became unemployed between 2001 and 2004 due to job loss.
Figure 13 depicts the weekly exit rate from UI beneﬁts for a subsample of those who
met the employment condition and were thus eligible for the maximum beneﬁt duration
of 100 weeks (i.e. 500 UI days). The peaks in the exit rate around 8 and 26 weeks are
driven by recalls, i.e. exits to the same employer for which the individual worked before
becoming unemployed (as before we have dropped temporarily laid oﬀ workers with a valid
employment contract from the sample). More importantly, the exit rate doubles at the
99th week. This spike however underestimates the true spike for two reasons. First, the
99th week of unemployment corresponds to the last week of UI entitlement only for those
individuals who did not participate in labor market training and did not collect partial UI
beneﬁts by that time. For past training program participants the beneﬁts do not expire
after 100 weeks of unemployment but at a later point due to receipt of a training subsidy
(which was abolished in 2010), smoothing the spike observed in the data. Working part
time on partial UI beneﬁts postpones the exhaustion day in the same way. Second, as
seen in ﬁgure 14, only a small fraction of UI recipients stay continuously unemployed for
53
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
Elapsed duration of unemployment, weeks
W
ee
kl
y 
ex
it 
ra
te
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Figure 13: Unemployment exit rate as a function of time spent in unemployment (1 week
= 7 calendar days). Sample includes 25 to 54 years old individuals entitled to 100 weeks
of UI beneﬁts at the beginning of the unemployment spell that started in 20012004.
almost two years. More than 95% of individuals have already left unemployment before
the spike.28 It is common that unemployed workers take up short jobs and then return to
unemployment. If such a job is too short to lead to renewal of the beneﬁt eligibility, the
worker will be entitled to unused UI beneﬁts from the ﬁrst spell at the start of the second
unemployment spell. If we follow the common practice and only include new UI spells in
the analysis, most of the observations around the beneﬁt exhaustion will be discarded.
Figure 15 shows the unemployment exit rate for all spells that started with receipt
of UI beneﬁts, that is, we also include the spells in which the entitlement period at the
start is less than 100 weeks (500 UI days). In this sample the elapsed duration of the
current unemployment spell and remaining beneﬁt entitlement do not move in parallel so
strongly. The horizontal axis in the graph does not represent the unemployment duration
but the time until beneﬁt exhaustion. The negative values indicate the weeks spent on
labor market subsidy after beneﬁt exhaustion. In this case, the exit rate is almost ﬂat
except for a sharp spike at the last week of the beneﬁt period. The exit rate is about 0.16
for the last week on UI beneﬁts, while its average level around that spike is around 0.04.
28This fraction of course depends on the sample restrictions and the time period under investigation
but it is very small anyway.
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Figure 14: Number of workers still unemployed by elapsed duration of unemployment (1
week = 7 calendar days). Sample includes 25 to 54 years old individuals entitled to 100
weeks of UI beneﬁts at the beginning of the unemployment spell that started in 20012004.
In ﬁgure 16 the overall unemployment exit rate is decomposed into exit rates to diﬀerent
destinations. We see that most of the spike in ﬁgure 15 is driven by exits to employment,
mainly to new jobs. The exit rate to nonparticipation jumps from a very low level to 0.04,
explaining almost an equally large share of the spike.
Figure 17 shows the number of workers who are still unemployed by remaining beneﬁt
entitlement.29 Compared to the number of people who stayed unemployed for at least 99
calender weeks in ﬁgure 14, the number of unemployed with only one beneﬁt week is 2.4
times larger but their population share is almost the same, being about 5%. A consequence
of such a small share is that the spike in the job ﬁnding rate at the beneﬁt exhaustion
cannot have a large eﬀect on the average unemployment duration despite its large size.
Only 2% of spells ended with a new job during the last 10 weeks of UI entitlement, and
0.3% of the spells during the last beneﬁt week.
Some studies ﬁnd that jobs accepted close to or after the beneﬁt exhaustion are lower
paid and shorter than those accepted earlier in the unemployment spell (e.g. Caliendo
et al. 2013). We do not see such evidence in ﬁgures 18 and 19 which show the average
29The ﬁrst category with 100 beneﬁt weeks in ﬁgure 17 is slightly larger than the ﬁrst category in ﬁgure
14 as the former includes also those who were entitled to 495499 days of UI beneﬁts at the beginning of
their unemployment spell.
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Figure 15: Unemployment exit rate as a function of time until beneﬁt exhaustion (1 week
= 5 payment days). Sample includes 25 to 54 years old individuals entitled to UI beneﬁts
at the beginning of the unemployment spell that started in 20012004.
wage and duration of next job by remaining beneﬁt entitlement for those who found a new
job (i.e. recalls excluded). While the re-employment wage exhibits a modest declining
pattern the duration of the next job is very stable until the beneﬁt exhaustion. There are
no notable drops during the last weeks of the beneﬁt entitlement period, but the average
duration of the next job is clearly shorter for those whose UI beneﬁts expired 10 to 20
weeks ago. It is worth emphasizing that the number of exits to employment is much lower
after the beneﬁt exhaustion: on average 33 per week compared to 158 per week during
the last 50 weeks of UI entitlement. The average duration of the next job is remarkably
high, being above one year for most of the time, because many workers found a stable
job. The median duration of the next job is much lower, around 20 weeks, and it remains
quite stable even after the beneﬁt exhaustion.
4.3.2 The Eﬀect of Potential Beneﬁt Duration
Except for a special case of the oldest unemployed entitled to extended beneﬁts, which is
discussed in the next section, there is no empirical evidence on the eﬀects of beneﬁt dura-
tion for Finland. This is not surprising as the maximum duration of regular UI beneﬁts
remained the same for the decades, and for the 2014 change we do not have data yet. In
56
0.
00
0.
01
0.
02
0.
03
0.
04
0.
05
(a)
 N
ew
 jo
b
W
ee
ks
 u
nt
il 
U
I b
en
ef
it 
ex
pi
re
s
Weekly exit rate
10
0
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
−
10
−
20
0.
00
0.
01
0.
02
0.
03
0.
04
0.
05
(b
) R
ec
all
 to
 ol
d j
ob
W
ee
ks
 u
nt
il 
U
I b
en
ef
it 
ex
pi
re
s
Weekly exit rate
10
0
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
−
10
−
20
0.
00
0.
01
0.
02
0.
03
0.
04
0.
05
(c)
 Jo
b 
pl
ac
em
en
t p
ro
gr
am
W
ee
ks
 u
nt
il 
U
I b
en
ef
it 
ex
pi
re
s
Weekly exit rate
10
0
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
−
10
−
20
0.
00
0.
01
0.
02
0.
03
0.
04
0.
05
(d
) N
on
−p
ar
tic
ipa
tio
n
W
ee
ks
 u
nt
il 
U
I b
en
ef
it 
ex
pi
re
s
Weekly exit rate
10
0
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
−
10
−
20
F
ig
u
re
16
:
U
n
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
ex
it
ra
te
s
as
a
fu
n
ct
io
n
of
ti
m
e
u
n
ti
l
b
en
eﬁ
t
ex
h
au
st
io
n
b
y
ex
it
d
es
ti
n
at
io
n
(1
w
ee
k
=
5
p
ay
m
en
t
d
ay
s)
.
S
am
p
le
in
cl
u
d
es
25
to
54
ye
ar
s
ol
d
in
d
iv
id
u
al
s
en
ti
tl
ed
to
U
I
b
en
eﬁ
ts
at
th
e
b
eg
in
n
in
g
of
th
e
u
n
em
p
lo
y
m
en
t
sp
el
l
th
at
st
ar
te
d
in
20
01
2
00
4.
57
Weeks until UI benefit expires
N
um
be
r o
f u
ne
m
pl
oy
ed
 w
o
rk
er
s,
 ´
00
0
100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 −10 −20
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Figure 17: Number of workers unemployed by length of remaining beneﬁt entitlement (1
week = 5 payment days). Sample includes 25 to 54 years old individuals entitled to UI
beneﬁts at the beginning of the unemployment spell that started in 20012004.
other words, there has been no variation in maximum beneﬁt duration that one could have
possibly exploited for identiﬁcation in the analysis. However, what we can do is exploit
variation in remaining beneﬁt duration at the beginning of subsequent unemployment
spells. Recall that workers who enter unemployment without satisfying the employment
condition may be entitled to unused UI beneﬁts from the previous unemployment spell.
Within this group the remaining beneﬁt duration can be anything between 0 and 499
days, being 0 for those who exhausted their UI beneﬁts in the past and for those who
have not received UI beneﬁts before. To identify causal eﬀects we can take advantage
of the 2003 change in the employment condition and exploit only the beneﬁt duration
variation caused by the reform.
In 2003 the minimum number of the contribution weeks required for the renewal of
the UI entitlement period was reduced by 21% from 43 to 34. Consequently workers
with 3442 contribution weeks have been entitled to UI beneﬁts for diﬀerent numbers of
weeks depending on their unemployment entry period. In particular, those who became
unemployed after the reform qualiﬁed for 100 weeks of beneﬁts, whereas those entering
unemployment before 2003 were entitled either to unused UI beneﬁts from the previous
spell or to the labor market subsidy. In section 4.1, we provided evidence that the 2003
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Figure 18: Average wage in next job by remaining beneﬁt entitlement at the time of
unemployment exit (1 week = 5 payment days). Sample includes 25 to 54 years old
individuals who were entitled to UI beneﬁts at the beginning of the unemployment spell
that started in 20012004 and who found a new job.
reform did not aﬀect the unemployment inﬂow, which implies that workers with 3442
contribution weeks before and after the reform are likely to be similar. It follows that
we can compare unemployment outcomes within this treatment group, using another
group whose eligibility status was not aﬀected by the reform as a control group. The
most natural candidate for the latter group are workers who are similar to our treatment
group members. We choose two such groups: workers with 2033 contribution weeks and
those with 4360 weeks. Once again we use a sample of workers entering unemployment
in the years 20012004 but now including only those with 2060 contribution weeks.
Descriptive Evidence We do not directly observe the contribution weeks in our data
but calculate them using information on job spells. Despite the sample restrictions discus-
sed earlier, some inconsistencies in the information obtained from the diﬀerent registers
remains. In particular, the number of contribution weeks from the job spell data do not
always match the UI records which are supposed to be highly reliable. To illustrate this
we depict the fraction of unemployment entrants who qualiﬁed for 100 weeks of bene-
ﬁts (500 UI days) according to the beneﬁt records as a function of contribution weeks
computed from the employment records for the spells starting before and after the 2003
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Figure 19: Average duration of next job by remaining beneﬁt entitlement at the time
of unemployment exit (1 week = 5 payment days). Sample includes 25 to 54 years old
individuals who were entitled to UI beneﬁts at the beginning of the unemployment spell
that started in 20012004 and who found a new job.
reform in ﬁgure 20a. In the absence of measurement errors, the share of the unemployed
with the maximum beneﬁt entitlement should be 0% until the threshold of 34 or 43 weeks
depending on the entry period, and 100% thereafter. As seen in ﬁgure 20a, this is not the
case and the degree of classiﬁcation errors is about 15% for the individuals with 3442
weeks.
Figure 20b shows the renewal rate by the month of unemployment entry for three
contribution week groups. The fraction of those entitled to 100 weeks of UI beneﬁts in
our treatment group with 3442 weeks increases sharply in the post-reform period, ending
up close to the level of workers with 4360 weeks. The renewal rate for workers with
2033 weeks also increases over time but to a much lesser extent. When measured by the
number of UI weeks the individual is entitled to at the start of the unemployment spell,
the diﬀerences between groups are less drastic, especially around the threshold values
of the employment condition (ﬁgures 20c and d). Obviously the sample members have
quite many unused UI weeks from the previous unemployment spell, which suggests they
experienced short UI spells in the past. The key insight from ﬁgure 20 is that despite
the measurement error in the contribution week variable, the beneﬁt eligibility in the
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treatment group changes markedly at the time of the reform compared to the two other
groups. This is the variation we exploit for identiﬁcation.
As discussed in section 4.1, our data includes a speciﬁc subgroup of individuals who
typically entered unemployment in June, stayed unemployed for the summer period and
then returned to employment in August. These workers have 41 or 42 contribution weeks
and large numbers of unused UI days due to their short unemployment episode covering
only the summer weeks. The presence of this group explains the large value of UI weeks
at 42 contribution weeks in the pre-reform period in ﬁgure 20c, as well as the spikes in
Junes for the treatment group in ﬁgure 20d.
In ﬁgure 21 we plot the average outcomes by group and month of unemployment
entry.30 As seen in ﬁgure 21a, unemployment spells were shortest for the treatment
group until August 2002. After September 2002, the average beneﬁt duration increased
in the treatment group compared to the other groups (ﬁgures 20b and 20d), which may
indicate that the increasing average unemployment duration of the treatment group after
the reform was caused by longer beneﬁt entitlements. The lack of diﬀerences in the
unemployment duration already in August and September 2002 does not ﬁt the story, but
it may also be driven by diﬀerential seasonal patterns as there were no diﬀerences in the
same months in 2001 either.
The average unemployment duration of workers with 2033 weeks increases over time
compared to the group with 4360 weeks. This is somewhat worrisome regarding the
parallel trend assumption we need in our analysis. Yet it may also reﬂect the diﬀerential
trends in the average potential beneﬁt duration in ﬁgure 20d: the average entitlement
period of workers with 2033 weeks increases over time in comparison to workers with
4360 weeks, and that should shrink the diﬀerence in the average unemployment duration
between the groups provided the longer beneﬁt duration leads to longer unemployment
spells. Because the macroeconomic conditions improved over the years in question, the
average unemployment entrant in the later years had experienced shorter UI spells in the
past, and would thereby have more unused UI days at the beginning of the current spell.
This is likely to explain the increasing trends of the beneﬁt entitlement for those with
2033 contribution weeks over all years and for those with 3442 contribution weeks in
the pre-reform period. The macroeconomic conditions probably had less impact on the
beneﬁt entitlement of workers with 4360 weeks. These are supposed to be entitled to 100
beneﬁt weeks in all years so that all the variation within this group is due to erroneously
classifying workers who actually have less than 43 contribution weeks into the group.
Another measure of successful job search is the probability that the unemployment
30To eliminate a few outliers we censor the unemployment spells at 120 weeks (2% of observations)
and the post-unemployment wages at the 99th percentile by replacing the higher values with these cutoﬀ
values.
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spell will eventually end with a new job. In ﬁgure 21b, we do not see much diﬀerence in
the fraction of spells ending in employment between the groups, nor any changes after
the reform. We also consider two measures of match quality: the wage and duration of
the ﬁrst post-unemployment job for those who found a job of no shorter than four weeks.
These measures are very similar for all groups and in all periods in ﬁgures 21c and 21d.
To sum up, the pre-reform trends in ﬁgure 21 are highly similar for diﬀerent groups,
and the changes in the average unemployment duration between the groups over time
are consistent with the hypothesis that longer beneﬁt periods lead to longer spells of
unemployment. On the other hand, there is no visual evidence implying that the beneﬁt
duration would aﬀect other outcomes than the unemployment duration.
Instrumental Variables Estimates Above we ignored heterogeneity in the size of the
treatment eﬀect arising from diﬀerent UI histories. Note that in the treatment group
a worker with 90 weeks of UI beneﬁts left from the previous unemployment spell can
qualify for 10 extra weeks of beneﬁts due to the reform while a worker who exhausted
his or her beneﬁts in the past may qualify for 100 extra weeks. By taking into account
the counterfactual beneﬁt eligibility we can increase the statistical power of our analysis.
Thus, in addition to the contribution weeks, we group the data also according to the
number of unused UI days from the previous spell. One category contains workers with
no UI beneﬁts left from the previous spell, i.e. those who exhausted their beneﬁts in
the past. Workers with at least some unused UI days are split into 20 roughly equal-
sized categories. Based on three categories for contribution weeks and 21 categories for
unused UI days we obtain 63 distinct groups. For each of these groups we then calculate
the average potential beneﬁt duration and average outcomes of the unemployment spell
before and after the reform. The idea is to compare the changes in the outcomes to the
changes in the potential beneﬁt durations across groups.
In ﬁgure 22 we plot within-group changes in the outcome variables against the changes
in the potential beneﬁt durations. For the majority of the groups, including the groups
of workers with 3442 contribution weeks who have close to 100 weeks of unused UI
beneﬁts, the change in the potential beneﬁt duration is small. These groups are packed
around a change of about ﬁve weeks in the potential beneﬁt duration. Despite the small
increase in the average beneﬁt duration within these groups, the unemployment spells are
slightly shorter on average and larger shares of workers found a new job in the post-reform
period due to better economic conditions in the later years. At the same time the average
duration and wage of the next job both declined pointing to declining match quality.
Obviously the changes in the potential beneﬁt duration are by far largest for the groups
of workers with 3442 contribution weeks who have none or only few unused UI weeks.
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These groups are located on the right-hand side of the graphs. Unlike in the other groups,
the unemployment spells became clearly longer in these groups. The change in the re-
employment rate does not diﬀer notably from other groups, but the post-unemployment
outcomes may have evolved slightly better than in other groups, albeit the diﬀerences are
rather small.
In the graphs we also show regression lines obtained by weighted least squares (WLS)
using the group sizes as weights. This regression line is not only provided for illustration
purposes but its slope can be interpreted as an instrumental variable (IV) estimate for
the eﬀect of potential beneﬁt duration. To see this note that instead of applying WLS to
grouped data one can obtain numerically identical results from individual-level data as
follows: ﬁrst regress by ordinary least squares (OLS) potential beneﬁt durations on the
group dummies interacted with the post-reform dummy, and then regress the outcomes
on the predicted values of the potential beneﬁt duration from the ﬁrst stage along with
the post-reform and group dummies (see e.g. Blundell et al., 1998). The key identifying
assumption is that diﬀerences in average outcomes across groups conditional on the poten-
tial beneﬁt duration do not change over time. This is the common trend assumption used
in the diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences analysis. Under the assumption the group/post-reform in-
teractions have no direct eﬀect on the outcome and thus we can use them as instruments
for the potential beneﬁt duration. The IV estimator also deals with the misclassiﬁcation
problem due to the measurement error in the contribution week variable.
The slope of the regression line in ﬁgure 22a suggests that one additional week of UI
beneﬁts increases the expected duration of unemployment by 0.17 weeks, which corre-
sponds to an elasticity of 0.61.31 The eﬀect on the re-employment probability is very
small and only marginally signiﬁcant. The implied elasticity is 0.04 (which is approxima-
tely the same as the regression slope). There is some evidence of positive impacts on the
quality of the next job: one extra week of beneﬁts is estimated to lead to an increase of
2.9 Euros in the expected post-unemployment wage and to an increase of 0.15 weeks in
the expected duration of the next job.32 Both of these eﬀects are statistically signiﬁcant
but much smaller than the eﬀect on the expected unemployment duration. The elasticity
of the post-unemployment wage is only 0.09 and that of the job duration is 0.19.
Table 4 reports additional results from individual-level regressions. For comparison
31The elasticity is approximated as 0.17× 68/19 where 0.17 is the slope of the regression line, and 68
is the average potential beneﬁt duration and 19 is the average unemployment duration in the pre-reform
period for workers with 3442 contribution weeks who did not meet the employment condition (i.e. we
drop misclassiﬁed workers who qualiﬁed for 100 weeks of UI beneﬁts according to the UI records). Other
elasticities in the text are computed in the same way.
32When analyzing the eﬀects on the post-unemployment outcomes, we use only observations on re-
employed workers who could be a selective group. However, this does not seem a signiﬁcant problem as
the eﬀect on the re-employment probability is typically very close to zero.
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Table 4: Estimates for the eﬀect of potential UI beneﬁt duration
OLS estimates IV estimates
Without
controls
With
controls
Without
controls
With
controls
N Mean (1) (2) (3) (4)
Unemployment duration 60,295 19.0 -0.047** 0.069*** 0.167*** 0.155***
60,295 19.0 (0.019) (0.015) (0.018) (0.020)
Re-employment probability 60,295 76.3 0.156*** 0.010 0.043* 0.050**
60,295 76.3 (0.016) (0.010) (0.025) (0.022)
Re-employment wage 45,532 2177 1.729*** 0.966*** 2.922*** 1.958**
45,532 2177 (0.274) (0.295) (0.972) (0.936)
Duration of next job 45,532 55.1 0.193*** -0.037* 0.148*** 0.143**
45,532 55.1 (0.040) (0.019) (0.056) (0.059)
Notes: Mean is for workers with 3442 contribution weeks in the pre-reform period. Table reports the
coeﬃcient on the number of the UI weeks the worker is entitled to at the beginning of the unemployment
spell. Interactions between group dummies and post-reform dummy are used as instruments in models
3 and 4. All models include year dummies. Models 2 to 4 also include group dummies. The set of
additional controls include gender, age, education, occupation, the calendar month of unemployment
entry, the duration and wage of the previous job, the sector of the previous employer, the reason for
termination of the previous job, the fraction of time spent in employment within the past 12 months
and 1224 months, and the fraction of time spent on UI beneﬁts within the past 12 months and 1224
months. The standard errors clustered at the group level are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: *** 1%,
** 5% and * 10%.
purposes we also report two sets of the OLS estimates. In model 1 we simply regress the
outcome on the number of UI weeks and year dummies, ignoring the endogeneity pro-
blem. The results from this model suggest a very attractive policy option: by providing
UI beneﬁts for a longer period, the policy makers could reduce the average time spent in
unemployment, increase the share of the re-employed and even help the unemployed to
ﬁnd better jobs in terms of both wage and job duration. Unfortunately these estimates
are severely biased. Because workers who are entitled to longer periods of beneﬁts wor-
ked more and collected UI beneﬁts for fewer weeks in the past, they are generally more
employable than others and therefore more likely to ﬁnd a good job quickly despite their
longer remaining beneﬁt entitlements.
In model 2 we add a large array of control variables, including the group dummies
that control for the eﬀects of contribution weeks and unused UI weeks from the previous
spell. Their inclusion mitigates the endogeneity problem. If both the contribution weeks
and unused UI weeks were observed without error, we could overcome the endogeneity
problem by controlling for their direct eﬀects (as all the remaining variation in the beneﬁt
duration would then be driven by the 2003 reform). As we only observe a noisy measure
of the contribution weeks, this approach is not feasible, even though the inclusion of
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the group dummies provides a partial solution. The results in this case imply that one
additional week of UI beneﬁts increases the expected unemployment duration by 0.07
week. The results for post-unemployment match quality are somewhat mixed: a longer
beneﬁt duration seems to increase the next wage but reduce the job duration, though the
size of the former eﬀect is very small and the latter eﬀect is only marginally signiﬁcant.
Except for the eﬀect on the job duration, the OLS estimates are similar to those in ﬁgure
22 but smaller in absolute value.
Our preferred speciﬁcations are models 3 and 4 where the group/post-reform interacti-
ons are used as instruments for the potential beneﬁt duration. Apart from including year
dummies (and a diﬀerent way of obtaining standard errors), model 3 corresponds to the
grouped data regression shown in ﬁgure 22 and therefore the results are almost identical.
As seen from model 4, adding a large number of control variables makes little diﬀerence.
The eﬀect on the post-unemployment wage drops by one-third but that was very small
to start with.
Table 5 shows several robustness checks for the IV estimates. The baseline results
from model 4 with control variables are reproduced in column 1. Excluding a somewhat
speciﬁc group of workers who became unemployed in June has very little eﬀect (model
2 vs. model 1). Likewise, if we drop those workers entering unemployment in 2002, as
some of them may have changed their behavior if still unemployed at the time when
the reform became public knowledge, the results remain stable (model 3 vs. model 1).
Dropping the spells that started with receipt of labor market subsidy kills the eﬀects on
the post-unemployment outcomes by cutting their magnitude by half but hardly aﬀect
the impact on the unemployment duration and re-employment probability. It is worth
emphasizing that excluding these spells leads to a somewhat selective sample in the sense
that a slightly higher share of the pre-reform spells are excluded as it was easier to qualify
for UI beneﬁts in the post-reform period.
In models 5 to 8 we relax the common trend assumption by allowing a distinct linear
trend for each of the 63 groups. These estimates are noisier but it is reassuring to ﬁnd
that the point estimates do not change much from the baseline results. The eﬀect on the
unemployment duration reduces marginally whereas the eﬀects on the post-unemployment
outcomes remain similar but lose their statistical signiﬁcance due to higher standard
errors. The only exception is the eﬀect on the re-employment probability which increases
to fourfold (model 5 vs. model 1). The point estimate of 0.217 in this case implies an
elasticity of 0.19 for the re-employment probability. This estimate is also robust with
respect to the sample restrictions (models 6 to 8).
In summary, our ﬁndings indicate that one additional week of UI beneﬁts increases
the expected unemployment duration by some 0.15 weeks, corresponding to an elasticity
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of 0.5. Although our approach diﬀers from other studies that exploit exogenous variation
in the maximum beneﬁt duration, our estimate is of the same magnitude. Our results
also imply a positive eﬀect on the re-employment probability. Our baseline estimate is
rather small with an implied elasticity of 0.05, but the size of the eﬀect appears to be
sensitive with respect to the common trend assumption. The longer beneﬁt period may
thus improve labor market attachment: an unemployed worker entitled to beneﬁts for a
long time may be less likely to move outside the labor force and hence more likely to ﬁnd
a job. However, part of this eﬀect on the re-employment probability can be mechanical
as we analyze the compensated spells of unemployment. Those individuals who exhaust
their UI beneﬁts but do not qualify for means-tested labor market support drop out of
the sample regardless of whether or not they continue job search. For these individuals
a longer beneﬁt period lengthens the follow-up period by postponing the day of beneﬁt
exhaustion.
Finally, our results indicate that one additional week of UI beneﬁts increases the
expected wage and duration of the next job by some 2 Euros per month and 0.15 weeks
respectively. The former eﬀect is very small, corresponding to an elasticity of 0.06, whereas
the latter eﬀect is economically signiﬁcant with an elasticity of 0.19. These eﬀects should
be interpreted with some caution as the potential selectivity of the re-employed group is
ignored. If we include also those who did not ﬁnd a new job in the analysis with setting
their wage and job duration to zero, the results remain similar. Compared to the evidence
from other countries that point to small positive or nonexistent eﬀects on the job quality,
our ﬁndings are broadly similar yet more positive. However, these ﬁndings are at odds
with our results for the eﬀects of the UI beneﬁt level discussed in section 4.2.
4.3.3 Extended Beneﬁts for Older Unemployed
Unemployment has been particularly high in the oldest groups.33 The unemployment
tunnel (UT) scheme described in section 2.4 contributes to this phenomenon in two ways.
First, employers often target dismissals at those employees who can qualify for the ex-
tended beneﬁts after exhausting their regular beneﬁts ﬁrst. Rantala (2002) and Kyyrä
and Wilke (2007) show that the unemployment risk of private-sector employees at least
doubles at the age limit of the UT scheme. Large employers in particular are found to
exploit the scheme when downsizing. Second, among unemployed workers eligibility for
extended beneﬁts notably decreases the probability of becoming employed again before
33Yet there are two distinct realities: the unemployment rate for 5564 years old workers is not parti-
cularly high according to the oﬃcial statistics based on the Labor Force Survey, even though a dispropor-
tionately large share of them are collecting unemployment beneﬁts according to the register data. The
gap between these ﬁgures is due to the fact that many older unemployed do not actively search for a new
job and hence are classiﬁed as being outside the labor force in the survey data.
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retirement.34 In an extreme case an unemployed worker entitled to UI beneﬁts until reti-
rement may choose to withdraw from job search entirely, in which case the employment
hazard equals zero. Kyyrä and Ollikainen (2008) take this possibility into account in
their analysis using a split population duration model. They estimate that approximately
half of the unemployed eligible for the beneﬁt extension eﬀectively drop out of the labor
market. Moreover, of those who remain active, only a small fraction eventually return
to employment due to demand constraints and poor economic incentives. These studies
examine a change in the age limit from 53 to 55 in 1997 and hence use rather old data.
A recent study by Uusitalo and Nivalainen (2013) reports similar ﬁndings by analyzing
the 2005 increase in the age limit. They ﬁnd that the UT eligibility increases transiti-
ons from employment to unemployment and decreases transitions from unemployment to
employment.
The UT scheme evidently acts as an early retirement scheme for many unemployed.
One concern is that the scheme is a close substitute for other early retirement options,
mainly for disability beneﬁts that are payable to all working age individuals with a di-
agnosed disability. If this is the case, restrictions in the access to the UT scheme can
increase the disability inﬂow, mitigating the employment eﬀect of such changes. Uusitalo
and Nivalainen (2013) and Kyyrä (2015) do not ﬁnd evidence that the past increases in
the age limit would have had notable spillover eﬀects on the inﬂow to disability beneﬁts.
Therefore the past reforms did not only reduce the unemployment of older groups but
also increased their employment levels.
The Finnish scheme is not an anomaly but extended beneﬁts are paid to the older
unemployed in many European countries. Several studies present evidence that extended
beneﬁt periods lower re-employment rates and are often used to bridge the time until
retirement (see Hunt, 1995, for Germany, Lalive and Zweimüller, 2004, and Lalive, 2008,
for Austria, and Tatsiramos, 2010, for a comparison of Germany, Italy, Spain, and the
UK). There is less evidence on the eﬀects of the extended beneﬁts on transitions out of
employment for other countries. One exception is Winter-Ebmer (2003) who examines the
extension of maximum unemployment beneﬁt duration from 52 to 209 weeks for workers
above age 50 in Austria. According to the results, the reform led to an increase of 4 to
11 percentage points in the annual unemployment inﬂow rate.
Inﬂow Eﬀects To illustrate how the UT scheme aﬀects the unemployment inﬂow we
plot the age distributions of new UI beneﬁt claimants over two periods in ﬁgure 23.
34On the other hand, the UT scheme increases the value of becoming employed, and hence probably
the employment hazard, for those who are above the age threshold but are not currently eligible for UI
beneﬁts as well as for all unemployed who are slightly below the age limit. This is so because by ﬁnding
a job the worker qualiﬁes for UI beneﬁts until retirement at the start of the next unemployment spell.
71
20 30 40 50 60
0
1
2
3
4
5
Age
Sh
ar
e 
of
 sp
el
ls,
 %
2002−2004
2007−2009
Figure 23: The age distribution of new UI claimants (i.e. those who qualiﬁed for 500 days
of beneﬁts) in the years 20022004 and 20072009
During the period 20022004 workers aged 55 or older at the time of unemployment entry
qualiﬁed for extended beneﬁts after exhausting their regular beneﬁts. In 20072009 the
age limit of the UT scheme was 57. In the earlier period almost 5% of all new UI spells
started at age 55 and 4% at age 56 compared to a steady share of about 2.5% for age
groups from 26 to 54. In the later period the diﬀerence between 55 and 56 years old and
slightly younger groups disappears but a spike shows up at the new threshold at age 57.
While the spike at the new age limit is smaller, clearly higher shares of new UI spells
started between the ages of 58 and 62 in 20072009 than in the earlier period. It follows
that a slightly larger share of all new UI spells started between the ages of 55 and 65 in
the years 20072009 (20%) than 20022004 (18%) despite the higher age limit in the later
years. Yet this should not be interpreted as evidence that the 2005 increase in the age
limit simply postponed unemployment entry among the oldest workers. It is likely that
in the later years more people were working and consequently at risk of being laid oﬀ in
their 60s also for other reasons than the change in the UT scheme. In particular, a large
pension reform in 2005 has reduced retirement before age 63 (Uusitalo and Nivalainen,
2013).35
To what extent layoﬀs are concentrated in the age groups eligible for extended beneﬁts
35The change in the UT scheme in 2005 was part of this larger reform.
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varies across industries and occupations. This is illustrated in ﬁgure 24 which shows
the number of new UI spells by age over the two periods for the members of certain
unemployment funds. Among both white- and blue-collar groups the UT scheme has
been actively exploited but not in all worker groups. There are no notable spikes at
the age limits for construction workers, nor for teachers. The underlying reasons for the
lack of the spike are likely to be quite diﬀerent. In the construction sector, employment
contracts are typically signed for the duration of each construction project, and hence the
employers may not often need to layoﬀ large groups of workers when downsizing.
A majority of unemployed teachers are recently graduated young persons who work as
substitute teachers before ﬁnding a tenure position. There is also a strange practice where
teachers on maternity leave often return to work for the holiday period, putting their
substitutes out of work for the summer months. This may explain why 43% of teachers'
UI spells in ﬁgure 24 started in June and as many as 75% between June and August.
Older teachers in permanent positions in the public sector are rarely laid oﬀ.
The layoﬀs of paper workers are strongly concentrated in the oldest groups as around
40% of UI beneﬁts were awarded to workers who can qualify for extended beneﬁts after
exhausting their regular beneﬁts. The paper industry is dominated by a few larger ﬁrms,
and large ﬁrms in particular are keen to ﬁnd soft ways to get rid oﬀ their workers when
downsizing.
As the existing studies have shown, laid oﬀ workers eligible for extended beneﬁts are
likely to stay unemployed for a long time. This suggests that the excess unemployment
inﬂow at the age limit of the UT scheme leads to higher unemployment levels also in the
groups above this age limit. Figure 25 demonstrates how the older groups are overre-
presented among unemployment beneﬁt recipients and in particular among UI recipients.
These ﬁgures do not only capture the high layoﬀ risk of older groups but also their poor
chances to ﬁnd a new job if laid oﬀ. The mass of older unemployed has moved by a few
years from 2003 to 2013 due to the increases in the age limit of the UT scheme. There
are many more workers around age 60 on labor market subsidy or basic unemployment
allowance in 2013 than ten years ago.
Long-Term Eﬀects of UT Eligibility We next examine the eﬀect of the 2005 reform
on labor market outcomes over the years up to 2013. As pointed out above, this reform
increased the age limit for the extended beneﬁts by two years and abolished the unem-
ployment pension which was replaced with additional weeks of UI beneﬁts. Since the
reform aﬀected only those born in 1950 or later, we compare the 1949 and 1950 cohorts
using the FLEED of Statistics Finland.36 The earlier cohort became eligible for the UT
36FLEED is a linked employer-employee data set with extensive information on earnings, employment
and characteristics of both workers and ﬁrms
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Figure 24: Number of new UI claimants (i.e. those who qualiﬁed for 500 days of beneﬁts)
in the years 20022004 and 20072009 by age and unemployment fund
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scheme at age 55, the later cohort at age 57 (see ﬁgure 5). We limit our sample to those
who worked in the private sector in 2001.
Figure 26 plots the average number of employment and unemployment months during
a given year for each 1-week birth cohort around the cutoﬀ value of January 1, 1950. In
2003, when neither cohort was eligible for the extended beneﬁts, there is no diﬀerence
between those born in diﬀerent years. In other years there are notable diﬀerences bet-
ween individuals born at the end of 1949 and those born at the beginning of 1950, and
these increase from 2005 to 2008 by which time the 1950 cohort had become eligible. In
relatives terms, the gap in employment between the cohorts increases over all years as
the employment level declines with age. In 2011, the average number of unemployment
months for the 1949 cohort drops compared to 2008 and well below the level of the 1950
cohort. This is because many of those born in 1949 were on unemployment pension by
that time.
The top-left panel of ﬁgure 27 shows the total number of employment months from
the years 20032013. It appears that workers born on the ﬁrst day of 1950 worked about
7 months more than their counterparts born one day earlier. As expected, there is a
noticeable gap of roughly 20,000 Euros in the cumulative labor income as well. It is quite
surprising to ﬁnd only a minor diﬀerence in the cumulative earned income, even though
the labor income is a major component of it. 37 Nor do we ﬁnd a diﬀerence in sickness
beneﬁts received during the 11-year period.
Table 6 shows nonparametric regression discontinuity estimates of the eﬀects of the
2005 reform on cumulative outcomes, i.e. the eﬀects of becoming eligible for the UT
scheme at age 57 instead of at age 55 (with the unemployment pension replaced by addi-
tional days of UI beneﬁts) for those born on the ﬁrst day of 1950. We report both con-
ventional and bias-corrected estimates from linear and quadratic speciﬁcations.38 These
results are in line with the visual evidence seen in ﬁgure 27. The eﬀects on cumulative
months employed and wages are statistically signiﬁcant and robust across diﬀerent spe-
ciﬁcations, whereas the eﬀects on earned income and sickness beneﬁts do not diﬀer from
37Earned income consists of all taxable income apart from capital income. In addition to labor income
it includes e.g. pension income, a fraction of business income, income from agriculture and taxable
beneﬁts such as unemployment beneﬁts.
38Calonico et al. (2014) argue that the bandwidth selectors that are commonly used in regression
discontinuity (RD) and regression kink designs tend to yield bandwidths that are too large to ensure the
validity of the underlying distributional approximations. As a result, the RD estimates may be subject
to a non-negligible bias and the resulting conﬁdence intervals can be severely biased. They propose
an alternative method where the RD point estimate is corrected by an estimated bias term, and the
standard error estimates are adjusted for additional variability that results from the estimation of the
bias correction term. This procedure yields bias-corrected point estimates and conﬁdence intervals that
are more robust to the bandwidth choice than the conventional methods. Calonico et al. (2014) also
introduce a new method to choose the bandwidth such that the point estimator is mean square error
optimal.
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Figure 27: Cumulative outcomes over the period 20032013 by birth week
zero.
These ﬁndings conﬁrm the observations in previous studies that the risk of job loss is
higher for workers who can qualify for extended beneﬁts and that those unemployed who
are entitled to extended beneﬁts are less likely to return to employment. The substantial
drops in cumulative employment months and subsequently labor income illustrate the full
impact of these employment eﬀects. The fact that cumulative earned income is aﬀected
to a much lesser extent has to do with the unemployment insurance and pension systems
and deserves further attention in future analysis.
Employer Liabilities It is noteworthy that employers' UI premiums for the oldest
workers are partially experience rated. When an extended beneﬁt is granted to the worker
born in 1950 or later, the former employer may have to pay a given share of the extended
beneﬁt costs as a lump sum payment to the Unemployment Insurance Fund. This cost
share increases linearly from 0% to 90% (from 0% to 80% for those born 19501956) as a
function of the employer's payroll in the year preceding the dismissal. The cost of extended
beneﬁts is calculated assuming the worker will collect them until age 63 irrespective of
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Table 6: Regression discontinuity estimates of the 2005 reform in the UT scheme on
cumulative outcomes
Months
employed
Wages Earned
income
Sick beneﬁts
(1) (2) (3) (4)
A. Linear
Conventional estimates 7.0*** 17952.7** 6918.6 -15.8
(1.1) (9990.7) (8473.8) (218.6)
Bias-corrected estimates 7.4*** 16378.9* 5405.9 -101.3
(1.3) (8483.7) (9975.6) (243.3)
Bandwidth 107.8 67.3 66.6 91.4
Observations 18,323 11,342 11,188 15,348
B. Quadratic
Conventional estimates 7.1*** 18249.5* 3993.7 -29.1
(1.4) (9781.6) (9341.8) (259.8)
Bias-corrected estimates 7.4*** 15710.7 2348.6 -100.5
(1.6) (10855.5) (10536.8) (285.7)
Bandwidth 153.2 113.0 121.1 145.1
Observations 26,581 19,357 20,812 25,103
Notes: Outcome variables are cumulative amounts for years 20032013. Estimations are done using
the rdrobust package (Calonico et al., 2016). Polynomial order for bias correction is quadratic for the
point estimator from linear speciﬁcation and cubic for the point estimator from quadratic speciﬁcation.
Bandwidths are mean square error optimal and symmetric on both sides of the cutoﬀ. Robust standard
errors reported for bias-corrected estimates. Signiﬁcance levels: *** 1%, ** 5% and * 10%.
the actual behavior. In the case of a worker who qualiﬁes for an old-age pension before
the regular beneﬁts expire, the former employer is liable for a share of the costs of regular
beneﬁts actually paid to the worker.
In the case of pre-1950 cohorts the former employer had to pay a similarly deﬁned
share of the unemployment pension costs to the pension provider. Hakola and Uusitalo
(2005) analyze a reform that changed the premium rates in 2000 and ﬁnd that the ex-
perience rating of the unemployment pension costs reduced early exits from work among
older workers.
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5 Discussion of 2017 Changes
A number of changes in the UI scheme came into eﬀect at the beginning of 2017. These
include:
• The length of the entitlement period was cut by 100 days (20 weeks) except for
those aged 58 or more with a work history of at least ﬁve years in the last twenty
years.
• The waiting period before beneﬁt payments start was extended by two days from
ﬁve to seven days.
• The increased beneﬁt based on a work history of at least twenty years was abolished.
• The increased beneﬁt for the duration of ALMPs speciﬁed in the activation plan
was slightly reduced.
It is of obvious interest to try to say something about the likely eﬀects of these changes
based on the evidence presented in this report. There is no doubt that the most important
change is the 100-day cut in the length of the entitlement period. That corresponds to
a 20% decline in the maximum beneﬁt duration for most unemployed under age 58 and
a 25% decline for those with less than three years of work history. We found that the
elasticity of unemployment duration with respect to potential beneﬁt duration is roughly
0.5. This suggests that the reform may shorten the unemployment spells of new UI
recipients under age 58 by some 10% provided that the share of UI recipients with less
than three years of work history is quite small.
According to the government's law proposal, the reform is assumed to increase em-
ployment by some 7500 person-years. This estimate is based on the assumptions that
there are 193,904 new unemployment spells for UI recipients under age 58 and that a one
week reduction in the beneﬁt entitlement shortens unemployment spells by 0.1 weeks on
average (our estimate is 0.15 weeks in section 4.3.2). Our results suggests that the latter
assumption is likely to be conservative. Plugging our estimate into the same formula used
by the government we obtain an estimate of about 11,000 person-years (which can be
found in the robustness section of the government's memo by chance). This ﬁgure as well
as the government's ﬁgure are likely to somewhat overstate the overall impact on employ-
ment. First, the shorter entitlement period may induce some UI recipients to leave the
labor force rather than to ﬁnd a new job more quickly. Second, more intensive search by
UI recipients can to some extent weaken the job ﬁnding prospects of labor market subsidy
recipients. Third, the shorter entitlement period may discourage job search among the
members of unemployment funds who are not currently eligible for UI beneﬁts and who
80
expect to experience additional spells of unemployment in the near future (through the
entitlement eﬀect). Finally, according to our ﬁndings in section 4.3.2, re-employed workers
may return to unemployment more quickly as the shorter entitlement period can induce
UI recipients to take up less stable jobs on average. Although it is diﬃcult to assess the
size of these eﬀects, they are probably relatively small in comparison to the direct eﬀect
of the reform on the job ﬁnding rate of UI recipients.
Perhaps a more critical part of the calculations is the number of new UI spells, which
appears to be a very rough estimate. An alternative estimate for the reform eﬀect can be
obtained by assuming that the aggregate number of UI days among workers under age
58 will be reduced by 10% due to the reform as implied by our elasticity estimate. This
is a more straightforward approach because the total numbers of UI payment days by
age groups are readily available from the oﬃcial statistics. Using the data from 2014, on
which the government's calculations are based, and ignoring the potential confounding
eﬀects pointed out above, this approach produces an estimate of 12,000 person-years for
the employment increase.39 If we use the most recent data from 2015, we obtain a slightly
higher estimate of 13,000 person-years.
To sum up, the 100-day reduction in the length of the entitlement period might increase
employment roughly by some 13,000 person-years due to the decrease in the average
duration of UI spells. But the overall employment eﬀect is likely to be somewhat smaller
because of an expected increase in the average unemployment duration of non-recipients
and other side eﬀects pointed out above.
Other changes in the UI scheme in 2017 are likely to have much less eﬀect. The longer
waiting period may reduce temporary layoﬀs and unemployment entries among those who
expect to be unemployed only for very short time, as well as encourage employed workers
whose employment contract is about to end to search more intensively for a new job. We
are not aware of any empirical results on the eﬀects of the waiting period.
Based on the ﬁndings of Uusitalo and Verho (2010), the abolition of the increased
beneﬁt based on the long working career may increase the job ﬁnding rate over the ﬁrst
18 weeks (i.e. 90 payment days) by some 1520%,40 which would imply a signiﬁcant
eﬀect on the expected unemployment duration. Despite this, the eﬀect of this change on
aggregate unemployment is negligible because the size of the aﬀected group is very small,
being around 5% of UI recipients.
The reduction in the increased beneﬁt that is paid for the duration of ALMPs speciﬁed
39The total number of UI days for workers between ages 17 and 59 is obtained from the Statistical
Yearbook on Unemployment Protection in Finland. The numbers are available for the 5-year age groups,
which explains the use of the upper age of 59 instead of 58.
40The increase in the beneﬁt level based on a long work history was smaller but it was available for a
much longer time during the period analyzed by Uusitalo and Verho (2010).
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in the individual-speciﬁc activation plans may discourage program participation somew-
hat. This probably has a very small, if any, eﬀect on unemployment spells because the
change in program participation is likely to be small and because ALMPs are not very
eﬀective at getting the unemployed back to work.
In addition to the changes in the UI scheme, several other changes that interact with
UI eligibility were also introduced at the beginning of 2017. These changes extended
the pool of jobs in terms of the distance and wage rate that are regarded as acceptable
for unemployed job seekers, and tightened the obligation to participate in the activation
measures. One change that is worth mentioning is that the unemployed are expected to
meet their caseworker more frequently.41 The meetings with the caseworker may expedite
re-employment for two reasons: ﬁrst, unemployed workers may receive moral support, job
search assistance and information about training possibilities (carrot), and second, they
are also exposed to close monitoring of their search activity and thus face a higher risk of
sanctions if they have not complied with the rules (stick). There is some evidence that
caseworker meetings enhance re-employment, and that both the counseling and monito-
ring components are likely to be important albeit the carrot side may be more eﬀective
(Rosholm, 2014). Moreover, compared to the traditional active labor market programs,
the caseworker meetings are inexpensive, do not involve lock-in eﬀects and possibly have
a larger eﬀect on the re-employment probability. Maibom et al. (2016) present empiri-
cal evidence on the eﬀects of the caseworker meetings based on randomized experiments
conducted in the Danish labor market. They also provide a brief survey of the previous
literature.
6 Summary
The aim of this report is to provide an overview of the Finnish UI system since the year
2000 and to summarize what we know about the behavioral eﬀects of the various com-
ponents of the beneﬁt scheme in the case of Finland. The main ﬁndings are summarized
below.
41According to the old rules, the ﬁrst meeting was supposed to take place within the ﬁrst two weeks
after the beginning of the unemployment spell, the next two after three and six months of unemployment,
and thereafter every six months. The meetings may have been passed if they were considered to be
unnecessary by the caseworker. As of January 1, 2017, the ﬁrst three meetings are as before but the
subsequent meetings should occur every three months instead of every six months. As such workers who
have been unemployed at least for six months are expected to meet their caseworkers more frequently.
In practice, the change in the meeting frequency may be higher because the realized frequency of the
meetings in the past has been much lower than indicated by the old rules.
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Evolution of Beneﬁt Generosity over Time We discussed how the key components
of the UI scheme have been changed during the past 15 years. These changes have aﬀected
the generosity of the UI scheme in opposite directions, partly oﬀsetting each other. The
changes in the employment condition in 2003, 2010 and 2014 have made the UI system
more generous by easing the access to the beneﬁts. By contrast, all changes in the length
of the entitlement period have reduced the beneﬁt generosity. These include the abolition
of the training subsidy in 2010, the shortening of the entitlement period in 2014 and 2017,
and increases in the age threshold for the extended beneﬁts in 2005, 2012 and 2015. In
terms of the beneﬁt levels the UI scheme became gradually more generous until 2012 due
to various beneﬁt increases, many of which were tied to the length of the working career
or participation in labor market training. More recently, the beneﬁt levels have declined
due to the beneﬁt cuts in 2015 and 2017.
To summarize these changes in a coherent way we computed the maximum amount
of UI beneﬁts for a reference population of new entrants to unemployment. This exercise
suggests that the overall generosity increased between 2002 and 2014, exhibiting discon-
tinuous jumps in 2003 and 2014 due to the loosening of the eligibility criteria. These
increases were followed by declines in 2015 and 2017 which brought the overall generosity
back to the level where it was at the beginning of the 2000s.
The development of the average beneﬁt generosity masks diﬀerent patterns between
groups. The generosity of the UI scheme for the oldest workers has decreased during the
period as they have been hit hard by the restrictions in the access to extended beneﬁts
and the abolition of the beneﬁt increase based on a long working career. Workers with 3
to 19 years of work history have overall beneﬁted from the changes. Those with less than
three years of work history are back at the same level of the generosity they were entitled
to in the early 2000s.
It should be stressed that these ﬁndings are only suggestive. Our measure of the
average generosity depends on the reference population, a rather arbitrary choice (those
with strong labor market attachment who became unemployed in 2009). The younger
unemployed are under-presented in the analysis because labor market entrants and those
with sporadic employment history are excluded due to the labor market history restrictions
made for the technical reasons. The beneﬁt level changes may also get too small a weight
compared to the changes in the entitlement period given that the daily beneﬁt level aﬀects
all unemployed whereas the length of the entitlement period is less relevant for a majority
of UI recipients who ﬁnd a new job relatively quickly.
Finally, it is worth noting that the ﬁnding that the average beneﬁt generosity has
returned to its early 2000s level does not mean that the incentives of the UI scheme would
not have changed over the period. Compared to the initial rules it is much easier to
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establish eligibility for UI beneﬁts, after which slightly higher beneﬁts are available but
for a much shorter time than previously. These features of the UI scheme aﬀect labor
market outcomes in diﬀerent ways.
Beneﬁt Eligibility and Unemployment Inﬂow We found no evidence that workers
would time their unemployment entry according to the employment condition rules, nor
that employers would target layoﬀs at those employees who satisfy the employment con-
dition. So it seems that the changes made in the employment condition came without
undesirable behavioral eﬀects. Yet there is a mechanical eﬀect: a larger fraction of en-
trants to unemployment meet the employment condition and thereby qualify for a new
period of UI beneﬁts, which in turn aﬀect their unemployment duration. Our results for
the 2003 reform suggest that this eﬀect on aggregate unemployment was very small.
It should be stressed that we only looked at the unemployment inﬂow among workers
who have not been in subsidized employment during the past two years. It is possible
that the more lenient employment condition has encouraged municipalities to place long-
term unemployed into jobs with wage subsidies in order to help them to qualify for a new
period of UI beneﬁts. If there is such an eﬀect, our analysis does not capture it.
Even though we found no inﬂow eﬀect for the employment condition rules, there is
sound evidence that the exit rate from employment to unemployment increases sharply
at the age threshold for extended beneﬁts. The size of this eﬀect varies across sectors
and worker groups, and it is known to be particularly large for the employees of large
ﬁrms. The excess use of the extended beneﬁts as a pathway to early retirement and as a
soft way to reduce the workforce when ﬁrms are downsizing is a major cause for a high
incidence of long-term unemployment among the oldest groups. The several increases
in the age threshold for the extended beneﬁts over the past years have alleviated the
problem, but there is a risk that the problem will worsen over time due to the gradually
increasing age threshold for old-age pensions. This may call for additional increases in
the age threshold for the extended beneﬁts in the future. Also the current practice where
the large employers are partly responsible for the costs of the extended beneﬁts received
by their former employees seems justiﬁed.
Eﬀects of Beneﬁt Levels The size of beneﬁt level eﬀects is still subject to some
uncertainty. According to Uusitalo and Verho (2010), the elasticity of nonemployment
duration with respect to the beneﬁt level is 0.8, implying that a 10% increase in the
daily beneﬁt would increase the expected time until re-employment by 8%. The elasticity
estimates by Kyyrä and Pesola (2016) are somewhat larger, being between 1.5 and 2.
The former estimate also captures the eﬀect of the removal of the severance pay and may
therefore be a bit too small, whereas the latter estimates are quite imprecise and sensitive
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with respect to the statistical speciﬁcation. Nonetheless, these results suggest that higher
UI beneﬁts lead to longer spells of unemployment, and the magnitude of this eﬀect is
relatively large compared to other countries.
The eﬀect of the beneﬁt level on the quality of the next job is diﬃcult to interpret.
Higher beneﬁts seem to lead to more stable jobs after unemployment but these jobs are
found to be lower paid on average. However, the net eﬀect of higher beneﬁts on earnings in
two years following the beginning of the unemployment spell is clearly negative. This eﬀect
is of particular interest as it summarizes the eﬀect of the beneﬁt level on unemployment
duration and subsequent jobs (up to the two-year limit). Our ﬁndings suggest that a 10%
beneﬁt hike will reduce earnings by 10% to 20% over the next two years.
It is diﬃcult to assess the role of the generosity of the partial beneﬁt scheme for
those who work part time involuntarily or take very short full-time jobs. The existing
evidence suggests that working on partial beneﬁts can provide a stepping stone out of the
beneﬁts into regular full-time employment in most cases. However, there is an obvious
risk that too generous rules encourage part-time work on partial beneﬁts at the expense
of full-time employment. How the introduction of the earnings disregard in 2014 has
aﬀected the prevalence of part-time unemployment and subsequent transitions to full-
time employment is still an open question.
Eﬀects of Beneﬁt Duration We found a large spike in the exit rate out of UI beneﬁts
just before the beneﬁts are about to expire. A notable part of this spike is attributed to
transitions to new jobs, which indicate that some unemployed wait until their beneﬁts
expire before they take up a new job. The size of this group compared to the entire popu-
lation of UI recipients is however very small. More importantly, most of the unemployed
probably react to the length of their entitlement period well before the beneﬁt exhaustion.
According to our results, one additional entitlement week (i.e. extra ﬁve beneﬁt days)
increases the expected duration of unemployment by 0.15 weeks, which corresponds to an
elasticity of 0.5. On the other hand, longer entitlement periods may improve the quality
of the next job. The eﬀect on the subsequent wage is quite small, but the eﬀect on the
expected duration of the next job is economically signiﬁcant with an elasticity of 0.19.
As such, a reduction in the length of the entitlement period induces UI recipients to ﬁnd
a new job more quickly but those jobs are shorter on average and thereby re-employed
workers may also return to unemployment more quickly.
A special case is older unemployed who can qualify for extended beneﬁts once their
regular beneﬁts have run out. It is well known that only a small share of this group will
return to employment. There are many potential reasons for this, such as poor economic
incentives due to unlimited UI duration, the lack of demand for their skills as most of
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them are poorly educated, and sample selection as some individuals in this group may
have entered unemployment by choice in order to exploit the extended beneﬁts as an early
retirement scheme.
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A Data Sources
In the empirical analysis, we use comprehensive data that was obtained by combining
various administrative registers. The primary source of information is the administrative
register on job seekers, maintained by the Ministry of Employment and the Economy
(TEM). The register covers all registered job seekers at the public employment service.
As without registrating as an unemployed job seeker the individual cannot qualify for
unemployment beneﬁts, all unemployment beneﬁt recipients  and many unemployed non-
recipients and employed job seekers  should be included in the register. This register con-
tains information on unemployment spells, training courses and subsidized employment
programs, as well as demographic characteristics like age, gender, education, occupation
and living region. This information is available from the early 1990s to 2016. However,
the register does not contain any information on receipt of unemployment beneﬁts, nor
on regular job spells. Therefore we supplemented the data by merging information from
other administrative sources.
The UI beneﬁts are paid by individual unemployment funds. Each fund however
reports the beneﬁts it paid out to the Insurance Supervisory Authority (FIVA) on a quar-
terly basis. From the beneﬁt register of FIVA we obtain information on unemployment
fund membership and received UI beneﬁts and earnings-related labor market training
subsidies. Along with daily beneﬁts the records also contains information on the remai-
ning UI entitlement at the end of each quarter. With this information we can keep track
of the number of days until the UI beneﬁt will expire. From the Social Security Institu-
tion (Kela) we obtain data on ﬂat-rate basic unemployment allowances and labor market
subsidies. Both the FIVA and Kela data are available from 1999 until 2013.
Finally, for all people who have been unemployed during the period 19992013, we
merged employment and earnings records from the beginning of their working career from
the registers of the Finnish Centre for Pension (ETK). ETK is a statutory co-operation
body of all providers of earnings-related pensions in Finland, which keeps comprehensive
records on job spells and earnings for the entire Finnish population. This information
can be regarded as highly reliable, as it will be used to determine pension beneﬁts. We
use the employment records to construct a measure for the number of contribution weeks
and to deﬁne the entry and exit states for the unemployment spells.
We deﬁne the spell of unemployment as the time the worker is collected unemployment-
related beneﬁts. More precisely, we combine sequential spells of beneﬁt receipt whose
distance is no longer than four weeks by treating such beneﬁt periods as part of the same
unemployment spell but ignoring the days without beneﬁts between the beneﬁt periods.
The time spent in training courses is counted as part of the unemployment spell. The
resulting unemployment spell may thus include periods on diﬀerent types of beneﬁts. For
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example, a worker may ﬁrst receive UI beneﬁts, then labor market training subsidy for the
duration of a training course, and ﬁnally end up to labor market subsidy after exhausting
UI beneﬁts. In some parts of the analysis we only consider earnings-related beneﬁts, so
that transitions from UI beneﬁts to labor market subsidy is treated are transitions to
nonparticipation or right-censored spells.
The unemployment spell may end with a transition to regular work, job placement
program (i.e. subsidized work) or nonparticipation. We observe all subsidized employment
periods in the TEM data. The data also includes information on exits to regular jobs
that applicants found themselves or through the referrals of the employment authorities.
However, the information on job ﬁndings may not be very reliable as the exit reason is
often missing for those workers who found a new job on their own. For these reasons, the
exits to regular work are detected by comparing the ending days of the unemployment
spells and the starting days of the employment spells. The employment records also
includes a pension insurance identiﬁer of the employer for each job spell, which we can
use to distinguish recalls to the previous job from exits to new jobs.
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